War, in human and animal societies, can be extremely costly but can also offer significant benefits to the victorious group. We might expect groups to go into battle when the potential benefits of victory ( V ) outweigh the costs of escalated conflict ( C ); however, V and C are unlikely to be distributed evenly in heterogeneous groups. For example, some leaders who make the decision to go to war may monopolize the benefits at little cost to themselves (‘exploitative’ leaders). By contrast, other leaders may willingly pay increased costs, above and beyond their share of V (‘heroic’ leaders). We investigated conflict initiation and conflict participation in an ecological model where single-leader–multiple-follower groups came into conflict over natural resources. We found that small group size, low migration rate and frequent interaction between groups increased intergroup competition and the evolution of ‘exploitative’ leadership, while converse patterns favoured increased intragroup competition and the emergence of ‘heroic’ leaders. We also found evidence of an alternative leader/follower ‘shared effort’ outcome. Parameters that favoured high contributing ‘heroic’ leaders, and low contributing followers, facilitated transitions to more peaceful outcomes. We outline and discuss the key testable predictions of our model for empiricists studying intergroup conflict in humans and animals. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Intergroup conflict across taxa’.

Intergroup conflict has been suggested as a major force shaping the evolution of social behaviour in animal groups. A long-standing hypothesis is that groups at risk of attack by rivals should become more socially cohesive, to increase resilience or protect against future attack. However, it is usually unclear how cohesive behaviours (such as grooming or social contacts) function in intergroup conflict. We performed an experiment in which we exposed young colonies of the dampwood termite, Zootermopsis angusticollis , to a rival colony while preventing physical combat with a permeable barrier. We measured social contacts, allogrooming and trophallaxis before, during and after exposure. Termites showed elevated rates of social contacts during exposure to a rival compared to the pre-exposure phase, but rates returned to pre-exposure levels after colonies were separated for 9 days. There was evidence of a delayed effect of conflict on worker trophallaxis. We suggest that social contacts during intergroup conflict function as a form of social surveillance, to check individual identity and assess colony resource holding potential. Intergroup conflict may increase social cohesion in both the short and the long term, improving the effectiveness of groups in competition.

A major goal in evolutionary biology is to elucidate common principles that drive human and other animal societies towards war or peace. One idea proposed to account for differences between human societies is the "democratic peace" hypothesis, which suggests autocracies are more warlike than democracies because leaders can pursue fights for private gain. Given that animals can make autocratic or democratic collective decisions, we consider whether the logic of democratic peace may apply across taxa. We adapt the classic Hawk-Dove model to consider conflict decisions by groups rather than individuals, finding support for the democratic peace hypothesis without mechanisms involving complex human institutions. We suggest that the degree to which collective decisions are shared may explain variation in the intensity of intergroup conflict in nature.