Across a range of legal regimes-including environmental, tort, employment discrimination, corporate, securities, and health care lawUnited States law reduces or eliminates enterprise liability for those organizations that can demonstrate the existence of "effective" internal compliance structures. Presumably, this legal standard rests on an assumption that internal compliance structures reduce the incidence of prohibited conduct within organizations. This Article demonstrates, however, that little evidence exists to support that assumption. In fact, a growing body of evidence indicates that internal compliance structures do not deter prohibited conduct within firms and may largely serve a window-dressing function that provides both market legitimacy and reduced legal liability. This leads to two potential problems: (1) an under-deterrence of corporate misconduct, and (2) a proliferation of costly-but arguably ineffective-internal compliance structures.The United States legal regime's enthusiastic embrace of internal compliance structures as a liability determinant is consistent with the increasing influence of what are referred to in this Article as "negotiated governance" models that seek to improve government regulation and/or the litigation process through more cooperative governance methods that provide a governance role to the regulated group and other interested parties. Drawing on the incomplete contracts literature, this Article argues that, although the negotiated governance model provides valuable descriptive insights into the mechanisms by which legal rules develop, the model's proponents minimize the dangers of opportunistic behavior during the renegotiation phases of governance (that is, the implementation and enforcement phases) by those with the greatest stake in the meaning of 487

Organ shortage is the major limitation to kidney transplantation in the developed world. Conversely, millions of patients in the developing world with end-stage renal disease die because they cannot afford renal replacement therapy-even when willing living kidney donors exist. This juxtaposition between countries with funds but no available kidneys and those with available kidneys but no funds prompts us to propose an exchange program using each nation's unique assets. Our proposal leverages the cost savings achieved through earlier transplantation over dialysis to fund the cost of kidney exchange between developed-world patient-donor pairs with immunological barriers and developing-world patient-donor pairs with financial barriers. By making developed-world health care available to impoverished patients in the developing world, we replace unethical transplant tourism with global kidney exchange-a modality equally benefitting rich and poor. We report the 1-year experience of an initial Filipino pair, whose recipient was transplanted in the United states with an American donor's kidney at no cost to him. The Filipino donor donated to an American in the United States through a kidney exchange chain. Follow-up care and medications in the Philippines were supported by funds from the United States. We show that the logistical obstacles in this approach, although considerable, are surmountable.

Researchers have made progress in understanding the role of repugnance in transactions involving the human body. Yet, often, the focus remains on exchange between individuals and how they mentally cope (or not) with repugnance. But these exchanges also entail a “vertical” dimension in which organizational and state actors both directly manage repugnance and also limit the repugnance management tools available to the marketplace. Analyzing repugnance and its management as an organizational and regulatory problem, in addition to an individual one, suggests that a single, harmonized system of exchange in bodily goods is unlikely to emerge with the passage of time.

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This Article examines agency-level activity during the preproposal rulemaking phase-a time period about which little is known despite its importance to policy outcomes-through an analysis of federal agency activity in connection with section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act, popularly known as the Volcker Rule. By capitalizing on transparency efforts specific to Dodd-Frank, I am able to access information on agency contacts whose disclosure is not required by the Administrative Procedure Act and, therefore, not typically available to researchers.