Five studies merged the priming methodology with the bystander apathy literature and demonstrate how merely priming a social context at Time 1 leads to less helping behavior on a subsequent, completely unrelated task at Time 2. In Study 1, participants who imagined being with a group at Time 1 pledged significantly fewer dollars on a charity-giving measure at Time 2 than did those who imagined being alone with one other person. Studies 2-5 build converging evidence with hypothetical and real helping behavior measures and demonstrate that participants who imagine the presence of others show facilitation to words associated with unaccountable on a lexical decision task. Implications for social group research and the priming methodology are discussed.

Despite the importance of doing so, people do not always correctly estimate the distribution of opinions within their group. One important mechanism underlying such misjudgments is people's tendency to infer that a familiar opinion is a prevalent one, even when its familiarity derives solely from the repeated expression of 1 group member. Six experiments demonstrate this effect and show that it holds even when perceivers are consciously aware that the opinions come from 1 speaker. The results also indicate that the effect is due to opinion accessibility rather than a conscious inference about the meaning of opinion repetition in a group. Implications for social consensus estimation and social influence are discussed.

Consumers chose between options that paired either an objectively inferior good with high relative standing (Your laptop is rated 60/100 in quality; others' laptops are rated 50/100) or an objectively superior good with low relative standing (Your laptop is rated 80/100 in quality; others' laptops are rated 95/100). Decision makers who try to make the "best" decision, known as maximizers (Schwartz et al., 2002), pursued relative standing more than decision makers who are satisfied with outcomes that are "good enough" (known as satisficers). That is, maximizers were more likely than satisficers to choose objectively inferior products when they were associated with higher relative standing. Subsequent analyses investigating decisions across time showed that maximizers' interest in relative standing persisted even when the nature of the tradeoff was made overt, suggesting it is a conscious aspect of the maximizer identity. Overall, results suggest that the maximizer self concept is more complex than has been previously assumed-they are focused on relative outcomes in addition to absolute outcomes. Imagine that you are given a choice to live in one of two possible worlds. In World A, you drive a car that is a medium quality brand rated 7/10 in parts and performance by Automotive Weekly. Nearly all of your acquaintances' cars are luxury models rated 9/10. In World B, you drive a car that is a fair quality brand, rated 6/10 in parts and performance by Automotive Weekly. Nearly all of your acquaintances' cars are low quality models rated 4/10. If given the choice, would you prefer to live in World A or World B?The focus of our current analysis concerns the conflict that arises between the quality of an item and the relative standing that item confers on its owner as compared to other consumers. Often in the marketplace quality and relative standing are confounded (e.g., high quality signals exclusivity), and the pursuit of the two is not in conflict. However, quality and relative standing are empirically separable constructs and are also distinguishable in many important real world consumer contexts. Quality and relative standing are separated, for instance, in the case of imitation goods, since internal quality is low, but the appearance of quality, and thus the good's relative standing, is high. The literature would suggest that one set of consumers (maximizers) are exhaustive in their search for the best product, while another group of consumers (satisficers) are satisfied with products and outcomes that meet a minimum threshold of acceptability and are thus "good enough." However, as seen above, the best can mean different things. A consumer looking for the best could be

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Making friends is critical to well-being. We also live in a society where the display of status is ubiquitous and billions of dollars are spent on high-status consumer goods. In the present analysis, we introduce the Status Signals Paradox: When making new friends, people tend to think that displaying high-status markers of themselves (e.g., a BMW, a Tag Heuer watch) will make them more attractive to others than neutral markers (e.g., a Honda, a generic brand watch); however, from the perspective of would-be friends, individuals who display high-status markers are found to be less attractive as new friends than those with neutral status markers. Six studies provide converging evidence of the status signals paradox.