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This study investigates the influence of board independence, board size, auditor's opinion, profitability (good or bad news) and industry sector, on the timeliness of annual financial reports among Jordanian companies. It covers 114 listed companies on the Amman Stock Exchange for the year 2012. The timeliness of the financial reports is measured by audit report lag. We find that the firms, on average, take more than two months to complete the audit of financial reporting. Consistent with most studies, we find that firms with improved performance (good news) are faster in publishing their financial reports than firms with declining performance (bad news). The results also show that firms with an unqualified audit opinion release their financial reports earlier than those that do not receive a clean opinion. In addition, firms with a smaller board report faster than those with a larger board. Nevertheless, there is no evidence of the influence of independent directors and type of sector on the timeliness of financial reporting. This study serves as an input to policy makers and regulators in formulating policies and strategies with respect to the timeliness of financial reports.

This study examines the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on a firm’s cost of equity. The corporate governance mechanisms examined consist of board size, board independence, CEO duality, multiple directorships held by board members, and board political influence. To accomplish the study objective, 210 firm-year observations for manufacturing companies listed on Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) in the period 2014–2018 are analyzed using panel data analysis techniques. The results of the fixed effects regression model reveal that CEO duality and board political influence negatively affect the cost of equity, while there is no significant effect of board size, board independence, and multiple directorships on the cost of equity. The results suggest that firms’ board of directors is an important factor in mitigating the agency problem suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976). They also suggest that information risk is priced, which is consistent with previous research such as Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002), and that the board of directors plays a role in reducing that risk in capital markets.

While often criticized, the independence of directors remains a crucial criterion for evaluating the effectiveness of the monitoring role of boards. This study examines the relationship between board independence and earnings management, paying attention to moderation role of family ownership concentration on this relationship using a sample of services companies listed on Amman Stock Exchange ASE. This study documented a significant and negative association between board independence and earnings management. In addition, the moderating role of family ownership concentration on this relationship was also negative. Thus, the board’s monitoring function was inefficient due to the concentration of ownership. These results were obtained through using multiple and sequential regression analysis for the research data from 2013 to 2016. This study provides new ideas for future research such as examining the impacts of the migration of capitals and investors from neighbouring countries such as Syria and Iraq.

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