The mind appears to be biased simultaneously toward both expected and unexpected inputs. For example, familiar scenes are usually perceived more readily than novel scenes, indicating the former bias, but a single novel object sometimes pops out from a familiar field, indicating the latter bias. A diverse literature and a computational model converge on the following resolution to this paradox: The former bias is conceptually driven and actually suppresses data-driven processing of expected inputs; in turn, this suppression disinhibits data-driven processing of unexpected inputs, yielding the latter bias. Evidence for suppressed data-driven processing of expected inputs is drawn from studies of perceptual habituation, semantic satiation, memory inhibition, inhibition of return, repetition blindness, primed inhibition, the word-inferiority effect, registration without learning, and both expert-and schema-based inhibitory effects. Evidence for enhanced data-driven processing of unexpected inputs is drawn from studies of the orienting response, mismatch negativity, memory facilitation, both expert-and schema-based facilitatory effects, and perceptual popout. The model, called mismatch theory, incorporates inhibitory and facilitatory perceptual dynamics and is found to simulate the opposing biases. Implications of mismatch theory for perceptual phenomenology, dynamic systems theory, mental health, and individual differences are also discussed.In a review of some of her research on perception and memory, Treisman (1992) concluded that by creating accumulated traces of past perceptual objects or events, the world molds our minds to recreate earlier experiences. At the same time, we retain an impressive capacity also to represent any new object that fails to find its match in our prior assembly of stored tokens. (p. 874) This observation echoes what Grossberg (1987) calls the stability-plasticity dilemma. How can the mind be molded to familiar environments and still remain vigilant for change? We suggest that the'opposing biases toward both what is most expected and what is least expected are among the most adaptive and revealing features of the mind. Part 1 of this paper presents a paradigmatic example of opposing mental biases in the form of our own prior work on novel popout. Part 2 outlines in general terms a possible explanation of novel popout and resolution of the stability-plasticity dilemma, called mismatch theory. Part 3 draws together diverse lines of empirical support for the key assumptions of mismatch theory. Part 4 de-

In several experiments, observers were given glimpses of 4-word arrays. Accuracy of word localization was tested after each array. Some words, called familiar, appeared many times across the series of arrays; others, called novel, appeared only once. The ratio of novel to familiar words in an array ranged from 0:4 to 4:0. When familiar and novel words were not intermixed (in 0:4 and 4:0 arrays), localization accuracy was higher for familiar words. However, when they were intermixed, especially in 1:3 arrays, accuracy tended to be higher for the novel words. This novel popout effect was the outcome of the suppressed localizability of the familiar words (relative to the 0:4 baseline) and the enhanced localizability of the novel words (relative to the 4:0 baseline). Novel popout may reflect an automatic orientation of attention away from more fluently unfolding regions of the perceptual field (familiar objects) and toward less fluently unfolding regions (novel objects).

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Following a shallow (count vowels) or deep (read) study task, old and new words were tested for both fluency of perception and recognition memory. Subjects first identified a test word as it came gradually into view and then judged it as old or new. Old words were identified faster than new words, indicating implicit, perceptual memory for old words. Independently of this effect, words judged old were identified faster than words judged new, especially after shallow study. Eight experiments examined the possible causal relationship between perceptual fluency and recognition judgements. Experiments 1 to 4 showed that fast identifications per se do not promote old judgments. Accelerating the identification of test items by semantically priming them or making them come more quickly into view did not affect recognition judgments. Experiment 5 showed that the usual association of fast identifications with old judgments is not an artifact of item selection because the association disappeared when the identifications and judgements were segregated into different phases of the test task. Experiments 6 and 7 showed tha the likelihood of old judgments increases directly with the pretested perceptibility of test words, but only after shallow study. Experiment 8 showed that the dependency of recognition judgments on perceptual fluency continues to hold when the requirement to identify the words before judging them is eliminated. We conclude that fluency of perception contributes to recognition judgments, but only when the fluency is produced naturally (e.g., through perceptual memory) and explicit memory is minimal.

Two experiments investigated the possibility that perceptual memory for words is dependent on level of awareness of those words. In Experiment 1, subjects attempted to report briefly exposed words in a study phase and then identify words that faded into view in a test phase. Old words appeared in both the study and test phases, whereas new words appeared only in the test phase. Perceptual memory, indexed as the faster identification of old vs. new words, was observed only for words correctly reported in the study phase. In the study phase of Experiment 2, words were flanked by digits, and the distribution of attention between words and digits was varied. Perceptual memory increased from nil to high levels as more attention was allocated to the words. These findings suggest that long-term perceptual memory is dependent on level of awareness of words in the study phase.