This article introduces this JBR Special Issue on simple versus complex methods in forecasting. Simplicity in forecasting requires that (1) method, (2) representation of cumulative knowledge, (3) relationships in models, and (4) relationships among models, forecasts, and decisions are all sufficiently uncomplicated as to be easily understood by decision-makers. Our review of studies comparing simple and complex methodsincluding those in this special issue-found 97 comparisons in 32 papers. None of the papers provide a balance of evidence that complexity improves forecast accuracy. Complexity increases forecast error by 27 percent on average in the 25 papers with quantitative comparisons. The finding is consistent with prior research to identify valid forecasting methods: all 22 previously identified evidence-based forecasting procedures are simple. Nevertheless, complexity remains popular among researchers, forecasters, and clients. Some evidence suggests that the popularity of complexity may be due to incentives: (1) researchers are rewarded for publishing in highly ranked journals, which favor complexity; (2) forecasters can use complex methods to provide forecasts that support decision-makers' plans; and (3) forecasters' clients may be reassured by the incomprehensability. Clients who prefer accuracy should accept forecasts only from simple evidence-based procedures. They can rate the simplicity of forecasters' procedures using the questionnaire at simple-forecasting.com.

This paper proposes a unifying theory of forecasting in the form of a Golden Rule of Forecasting. The Golden Rule is to be conservative. A conservative forecast is consistent with cumulative knowledge about the present and the past. To be conservative, forecasters must seek all knowledge relevant to the problem, and use methods that have been validated for the situation. A checklist of 28 guidelines is provided to implement the Golden Rule. This article's review of research found 150 experimental comparisons; all supported the guidelines. The average error reduction from following a single guideline (compared to common practice) was 28 percent. The Golden Rule Checklist helps forecasters to forecast more accurately, especially when the situation is uncertain and complex, and when bias is likely. Nonexperts who know the Golden Rule can identify dubious forecasts quickly and inexpensively. To date, ignorance of research findings, bias, sophisticated statistical procedures, and the proliferation of big data have led forecasters to violate the Golden Rule. As a result, despite major advances in forecasting methods, evidence that forecasting practice has improved over the past half-century is lacking.

This article reviews experimental evidence on the effects of policies intended to promote behavior by firms that is more socially responsible and less socially irresponsible. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) can provide firms with opportunities for profit, but changes are likely to increase total welfare only if firms adopt them freely and without taxpayer subsidies. Mandated CSR circumvents people's own plans and preferences, distorts the allocation of resources, and increases the likelihood of irresponsible decisions. Evidence that government policies will increase welfare and a compelling argument that proven benefits justify reductions in freedom are necessary in order to justify CSR mandates. To date, this has apparently not been achieved. Corporate social irresponsibility (CSI) is concerned with whether firms undertake harmful actions that managers would be unwilling to undertake acting for themselves, or that a reasonable person would expect to cause substantive net harm when all parties are considered. Markets in which stakeholders are free to make decisions in their own interests provide some protection against CSI. Tort and contract law provide additional protection. Nevertheless, managers sometimes act irresponsibly. Codes of ethics that require fair treatment of stakeholders while pursuing long-term profit reduce the risk of irresponsible decisions. Management support and stakeholder accounting are important for successful implementation. Firms may wish to consider these measures; many already have.

No abstract

When people forecast, they often use analogies, but in an unstructured manner. We propose a structured judgmental procedure that involves asking experts to list as many analogies as they can, rate how similar the analogies are to the target situation, and match the outcomes of the analogies with possible outcomes of the target. An administrator would then derive a forecast from the experts' information. We compared structured analogies with unaided judgments for predicting the decisions made in eight conflict situations. These were difficult forecasting problems; the 32% accuracy of the unaided experts was only slightly better than chance. In contrast, 46% of structured-analogies forecasts were accurate. Among experts who were independently able to think of two or more analogies and who had direct experience with their closest analogy, 60% of forecasts were accurate. Collaboration did not improve accuracy.

This article introduces this JBR Special Issue on simple versus complex methods in forecasting. Simplicity in forecasting requires that (1) method, (2) representation of cumulative knowledge, (3) relationships in models, and (4) relationships among models, forecasts, and decisions are all sufficiently uncomplicated as to be easily understood by decision-makers. Our review of studies comparing simple and complex methods -including those in this special issue -found 97 comparisons in 32 papers. None of the papers provide a balance of evidence that complexity improves forecast accuracy. Complexity increases forecast error by 27 percent on average in the 25 papers with quantitative comparisons. The finding is consistent with prior research to identify valid forecasting methods: all 22 previously identified evidence-based forecasting procedures are simple. Nevertheless, complexity remains popular among researchers, forecasters, and clients. Some evidence suggests that the popularity of complexity may be due to incentives: (1) researchers are rewarded for publishing in highly ranked journals, which favor complexity; (2) forecasters can use complex methods to provide forecasts that support decisionmakers' plans; and (3) forecasters' clients may be reassured by incomprehensibility. Clients who prefer accuracy should accept forecasts only from simple evidence-based procedures. They can rate the simplicity of forecasters' procedures using the questionnaire at simple-forecasting.com.

This paper proposes a unifying theory of forecasting in the form of a Golden Rule of Forecasting. The Golden Rule is to be conservative. A conservative forecast is consistent with cumulative knowledge about the present and the past. To be conservative, forecasters must seek all knowledge relevant to the problem, and use methods that have been validated for the situation. A checklist of 28 guidelines is provided to implement the Golden Rule. This article's review of research found 150 experimental comparisons; all supported the guidelines. The average error reduction from following a single guideline (compared to common practice) was 28 percent. The Golden Rule Checklist helps forecasters to forecast more accurately, especially when the situation is uncertain and complex, and when bias is likely. Nonexperts who know the Golden Rule can identify dubious forecasts quickly and inexpensively. To date, ignorance of research findings, bias, sophisticated statistical procedures, and the proliferation of big data have led forecasters to violate the Golden Rule. As a result, despite major advances in forecasting methods, evidence that forecasting practice has improved over the past half-century is lacking.

Policymakers need to know whether prediction is possible and if so whether any proposed forecasting method will provide forecasts that are substantively more accurate than those from the relevant benchmark method. Inspection of global temperature data suggests that it is subject to irregular variations on all relevant time scales and that variations during the late 1900s were not unusual. In such a situation, a "no change" extrapolation is an appropriate benchmark forecasting method. We used the U.K. Met Office Hadley Centre's annual average thermometer data from 1850 through 2007 to examine the performance of the benchmark method. The accuracy of forecasts from the benchmark is such that even perfect forecasts would be unlikely to help policymakers. For example, mean absolute errors for 20-and 50-year horizons were 0.18°C and 0.24°C. We nevertheless demonstrate the use of benchmarking with the example of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's 1992 linear projection of long-term warming at a rate of 0.03°C-per-year. The small sample of errors from ex ante projections at 0.03°C-per-year for 1992 through 2008 was practically indistinguishable from the benchmark errors. Validation for long-term forecasting, however, requires a much longer horizon. Again using the IPCC warming rate for our demonstration, we projected the rate successively over a period analogous to that envisaged in their scenario of exponential CO 2 growth-the years 1851 to 1975. The errors from the projections were more than seven times greater than the errors from the benchmark method. Relative errors were larger for longer forecast horizons. Our validation exercise illustrates the importance of determining whether it is possible to obtain forecasts that are more useful than those from a simple benchmark before making expensive policy decisions. ABSTRACT Policymakers need to know whether prediction is possible and if so whether any proposed forecasting method will provide forecasts that are substantively more accurate than those from the relevant benchmark method. Inspection of global temperature data suggests that it is subject to irregular variations on all relevant time scales and that variations during the late 1900s were not unusual. In such a situation, a "no change" extrapolation is an appropriate benchmark forecasting method. We used the U.K. Met Office Hadley Centre's annual average thermometer data from 1850 through 2007 to examine the performance of the benchmark method. The accuracy of forecasts from the benchmark is such that even perfect forecasts would be unlikely to help policymakers. For example, mean absolute errors for 20-and 50-year horizons were 0.18°C and 0.24°C. We nevertheless demonstrate the use of benchmarking with the example of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's 1992 linear projection of long-term warming at a rate of 0.03°C-per-year. The small sample of errors from ex ante projections at 0.03°C-per-year for 1992 through 2008 was practically indistinguishable from the benchmark errors. Val...