Dopamine-containing neurons have been implicated in reward and decision making. One element of the supporting evidence is that cocaine, like other drugs that increase dopaminergic neurotransmission, powerfully potentiates reward seeking. We analyze this phenomenon from a novel perspective, introducing a new conceptual framework and new methodology for determining the stage(s) of neural processing at which drugs, lesions and physiological manipulations act to influence reward-seeking behavior. Cocaine strongly boosts the proclivity of rats to work for rewarding electrical brain stimulation. We show that the conventional conceptual framework and methods do not distinguish between three conflicting accounts of how the drug produces this effect: increased sensitivity of brain reward circuitry, increased gain, or decreased subjective reward costs. Sensitivity determines the stimulation strength required to produce a reward of a given intensity (a measure analogous to the KM of an enzyme) whereas gain determines the maximum intensity attainable (a measure analogous to the vmax of an enzyme-catalyzed reaction). To distinguish sensitivity changes from the other determinants, we measured and modeled reward seeking as a function of both stimulation strength and opportunity cost. The principal effect of cocaine was a two-fourfold increase in willingness to pay for the electrical reward, an effect consistent with increased gain or decreased subjective cost. This finding challenges the long-standing view that cocaine increases the sensitivity of brain reward circuitry. We discuss the implications of the results and the analytic approach for theories of how dopaminergic neurons and other diffuse modulatory brain systems contribute to reward pursuit, and we explore the implications of the conceptual framework for the study of natural rewards, drug reward, and mood.

Extracellular dopamine levels were measured in the rat nucleus accumbens by means of in vivo microdialysis. Delivery of rewarding medial forebrain bundle stimulation at a low rate (5 trains/min) produced a sustained elevation of dopamine levels, regardless of whether train onset was predictable. When the rate of train delivery was increased to 40 trains/min, dopamine levels rose rapidly during the first 40 min but then declined toward the baseline range. The rewarding impact of the stimulation was reduced following prior delivery of stimulation at the high, but not the low, rate. These results support the idea that dopamine tone plays an enabling role in brain stimulation reward and is elevated similarly by predictable and unpredictable stimulation.

Dopaminergic neurons contribute to intracranial self-stimulation (ICSS) and other reward-seeking behaviors, but itis not yet known where dopaminergic neurons intervene in the neural circuitry underlying reward pursuit or which psychological processes are involved. In rats working for electrical stimulation of the medial forebrain bundle, we assessed the effect of GBR-12909 (1-[2-[bis(4-fluorophenyl)-methoxy]ethyl]-4-[3-phenylpropyl]piperazine), a specific blocker of the dopamine transporter. Operant performance was measured as a function of the strength and cost of electrical stimulation. GBR-12909 increased the opportunity cost most subjects were willing to pay for a reward of a given intensity. However, this effect was smaller than that produced by a regimen of cocaine administration that drove similar increases in nucleus accumbens (NAc) dopamine levels in unstimulated rats. Delivery of rewarding stimulation to drug-treated rats caused an additional increase in dopamine concentration in the NAc shell in cocaine-treated, but not GBR-12909-treated, rats. These behavioral and neurochemical differences may reflect blockade of the norepinephrine transporter by cocaine but not by GBR-12909. Whereas the effect of psychomotor stimulants on ICSS has long been attributed to dopaminergic action at early stages of the reward pathway, the results reported here imply that increased dopamine tone boosts reward pursuit by acting at or beyond the output of the circuitry that temporally and spatially summates the output of the directly stimulated neurons underlying ICSS. The observed enhancement of reward seeking could be attributable to a decrease in the value of competing behaviors, a decrease in subjective effort costs, or an increase in reward-system gain.

The reward-mountain model relates the vigor of reward seeking to the strength and cost of reward. Application of this model provides information about the stage of processing at which manipulations such as drug administration, lesions, deprivation states, and optogenetic interventions act to alter reward seeking. The model has been updated by incorporation of new information about frequency following in the directly stimulated neurons responsible for brain stimulation reward and about the function that maps objective opportunity costs into subjective ones. The behavioral methods for applying the model have been updated and improved as well. To assess the impact of these changes, two related predictions of the model that were supported by earlier work have been retested: (1) altering the duration of rewarding brain stimulation should change the pulse frequency required to produce a reward of half-maximal intensity, and (2) this manipulation should not change the opportunity cost at which half-maximal performance is directed at earning a maximally intense reward. Prediction 1 was supported in all six subjects, but prediction 2 was supported in only three. The latter finding is interpreted to reflect recruitment, at some stimulation sites, of a heterogeneous reward substrate comprising dual, parallel circuits that integrate the stimulation-induced neural signals.

Rats were offered a forced choice between a train of brain stimulation that varied in strength from trial to trial and a fixed standard reward. This standard reward consisted of an intraoral sucrose infusion presented either alone or paired with an equipreferred train of brain stimulation. Postingestional effects were minimized by opening a gastric cannula. The presence of a sucrose standard led the subjects to forgo trains of brain stimulation for which they had responded when the sucrose was absent. The strength of the brain stimulation required to balance the compound reward exceeded the stimulation strength required to balance a reward consisting of sucrose alone. These results imply that the rewarding effects of brain stimulation and intraoral sucrose can be evaluated in a common system of measurement and combined.