Are poor macroeconomic outcomes primarily the result of economic policies, or of deeper underlying state fragility problems in sub-Saharan Africa? We attempt to answer this question by using carefully specified dynamic panel regression techniques to show how state fragility conditions help to explain the differences in the macroeconomic performance of sub-Saharan African economies, and to identify the most plausible mechanisms of transmission. We find that countries with greater fragility suffer higher macroeconomic volatility and crisis; they also experience weaker growth. When we disaggregate state fragility into its various components, we find that it is the security and social components that have the strongest causal impact on macroeconomic outcomes, while the political component is, at best, weak. Therefore, we conclude that it is state fragility conditions, and not necessarily macroeconomic policies, that are of first-order importance in explaining the differences in macroeconomic performance for African countries. The knock-on effects are mostly mediated through the fiscal channel, the aid channel, and the finance channel. Accordingly, we recommend that interventions in fragile states should best focus on exploiting the potential for using fiscal policy, aid, and finance as instruments to improve macroeconomic outcomes in sub-Saharan Africa.

This paper investigates whether and how aid targeted at specific subcategories of economic infrastructure could assist the economies of 14 Economic Community of West African States to attract higher foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow via improvement in infrastructure in water supply and sanitation, energy, transport and ICT. By relying on the three stage least squares estimation technique that is able to account for endogeneity among structural equations, and utilizing data spanning 2005-2018, we found quite interesting results. First, aid targeted at infrastructure indicates a strong positive effect on the countries' infrastructure endowment. Second, there is robust evidence that aid promotes FDI, but not necessarily through the infrastructure channel. Targeted aid appears to exert a positive and direct knock-on effect on FDI-apparently, because investors anticipate the positive effect that targeted aid is almost always inclined to produce on host countries' infrastructure endowment. Finally, aid allocation by Development Assistance Committee donors seems to have been primarily merit-based, followed by weaker evidence for "need". The study recommends, inter alia, more need-based aid allocation, particularly in economies where initial infrastructure endowment is minimal.

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This paper considers the structural and institutional determinants of investment activity in selected African countries within a neoclassical framework. Generalized method of moments and a family of panel data estimation techniques are utilized in addition to nonparametric kernel regression techniques to uncover the relationship.Three main findings emerge; (i) financial openness and institutional quality are reasonably robust structural and institutional determinants of investment activity in Africa respectively, (ii) there is evidence of nonlinearity in the relationship and there exist a threshold level of financial openness that achieves the highest level of investment, (iii) using interaction terms, the inhibiting effect of financial openness is potentially less in countries with higher levels of institutional quality, (iv) promoting institutional quality is an effective policy towards facilitating investment activity in Africa.

Those with dissenting view regarding the structure of monetary union arrangement in ECOWAS often argue that the macroeconomic convergence criteria have hampered the ability of countries in the region to stabilize their economies with appropriate counter-cyclical fiscal policy. We test the empirical merit of this assertion and found no support for this view. Instead, discretionary fiscal policy has actually become counter-cyclical in ECOWAS after the introduction of convergence criteria. In specifics, we found a switch from pro-cyclical fiscal policymaking in the pre-convergence era (1995–2002) to a counter-cyclical fiscal policymaking in the convergence era (2003–2018) in ECOWAS, and that policymakers in the region respond to initial conditions - apparently taking clue from past (initial) debt and past deficit. The policy import of our result is the need to: (i) introduce more flexibility in fiscal policymaking through discretionary fiscal policy that balances the budget (against the constraints imposed by the convergence rules) over the business cycle; and (ii) adopt ‘discretionary fiscal deficit’ to monitor compliance (rather than gross deficit) because it represents effort made to correct excess deficit.