A manual production line was examined for effects of 2 different material flow policies and 3 different goal-setting policies. The line used a push system, where workers work at their own pace (assuming available work) and pass work to the next station as soon as the work is completed, and a pull system, where workers pass work only when the next worker needs it. Three different goal-setting policies involved no specified goals, individual goals, or group goals confounded with monetary incentives and feedback. Measurements were taken from unobtrusive videotaping and worker questionnaires. Analyses indicated productivity increased approximately 25% when group goals were matched to a pull policy (compared to a push policy with no specified goals). Other results relating to productivity and job satisfaction are discussed.The organization and the management of manufacturing facilities have received considerable attention, particularly in light of concerns about U.S. competitiveness in the goods-producing sectors. It is well recognized that compared with traditional U.S. plants, Japanese plants have taken a different structural perspective, emphasizing what has been called a just-in-time (JIT) approach. There have been numerous debates about the implementation and the effectiveness of JIT structures (Karmarkar, 1989;Zipkin, 1991), with some recent articles emphasizing the importance of recognizing changes in the social system that take place when these kinds of structures are introduced (Brown & Mitchell, 1991;Huber & Brown, 1991;J. Klein, 1991).Consideration of the sociotechnical implications of new process technology is seen as critical to its successful introduction (Shani, Grant, Krishnan, & Thompson, 1992). The present study examined effects of a move to JIT production (a technical variable) and a goal-setting-feedbackreward intervention (social variables) on a manual flow line

Work flow policies are shown to induce a change in average between-workers variability (worker heterogeneity) and within-worker variability in performance times. In a laboratory experiment, the authors measured the levels of worker heterogeneity and within-worker variability under an individual performance condition, a work sharing condition, and a fixed assignment condition. The work sharing policy increased the levels of worker heterogeneity and worker variability, whereas the fixed assignment policy decreased them. These effects, along with work flow policy main effects on mean performance times and variability are examined. This article represents an initial step in understanding effects that may be important in the selection of an operating policy, the ignorance of which may lead to costly misestimates of performance.

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Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Performance Based Logistics is an acquisition reform that is intended to improve weapon systems logistics by reducing cost, improving reliability, and reducing footprint. It is an extension of a broad process of rationalizing, and in many cases outsourcing government services. As with other examples of governmental service outsourcing measurement issues arise, in the gap between governmental objectives and service measurement, and in the contrast between clear profitcentered vendor metrics, and more complex mission-oriented governmental metrics. Beyond this however, PBL presents new challenges to the relationship between governmental agencies and their service vendors. In many cases, weapons systems logistical support involves levels of operational risk that are more difficult to measure and more difficult to value than other government services. We discuss the implications of operational risk and other measurement issues on PBL implementation. SUBJECT TERMS AbstractPerformance Based Logistics is an acquisition reform that is intended to improve weapon systems logistics by reducing cost, improving reliability, and reducing footprint.It is an extension of a broad process of rationalizing, and in many cases outsourcing government services. As with other examples of governmental service outsourcing measurement issues arise, in the gap between governmental objectives and service measurement, and in the contrast between clear profit-centered vendor metrics, and more complex mission-oriented governmental metrics. Beyond this however, PBL presents new challenges to the relationship between governmental agencies and their service vendors. In many cases, weapons systems logistical support involves levels of operational risk that are more difficult to measure and more difficult to value than other government services. We discuss the implications of operational risk and other measurement issues on PBL implementation.

Three sources of'variability in task completion times are identified: the task itself, the worker performing the task, and the environment where the task is performed. Although a11 three sources might play a role, for practical purposes researchers seek a parsimonious model of variability in task completion times which identifies the most significant source. It is typically assumed that the most significant sources are the task itself or the environment where the task is performed. In this paper we investigate the notion that the worker performing the task may be the most significant source of variability in task completion times, and propose a modeling approach for this situation. We also present the results of a field experiment that support the proposed modeling approach.