In this paper, we analyze the nature of intra-household allocations and commitment using unique panel data on individual-specific withinhousehold consumption expenditures and on time used for leisure, market production and home production. Specifically we estimate a dynamic collective model of the household in which husbands and wives care about private consumption, private leisure, and a public good produced in the home with time and market purchased inputs. We find that the household weight on the wife is strongly related to her relative market productivity in the cross-section. Additionally, within households the weight on the wife is related to unpredicted changes in relative wages, but the effect is about half as strong, and only statistically significant for large changes. Our results are consistent with limited commitment within the household: small shocks are fully insured while large shocks provoke a renegotiation.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may March, 2003Abstract Classified broadly, two motives for intra-family transfers exist: altruism and selfishness. This paper examines two selfish hypotheses − the exchange motive (strategic bequest motive) and the demonstration effect − using a new Japanese micro data set. My analysis of the determinants of intergenerational co-residence, distance between residences, and frequency of contact yields considerable support for the exchange motive but no support for the demonstration effect. The findings are consistent with the exchange motive after distinguishing it from mutual altruism using a specific question.

In this paper we document the main features of the distributions of wages, earnings, consumption and wealth in Japan since the early 1980s using four main data sources: the Basic Survey on Wage Structure (BSWS), the Family Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES), the National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure (NSFIE) and the Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers (JPSC). We present an empirical analysis of inequality that specifically considers the path from individual wages and earnings, to household earnings, after-tax income, and finally consumption. We find that household earnings inequality rose substantially over this period. Inequality in disposable income and in consumption also rose over this period but to a lesser extent, suggesting taxes and transfers as well as insurance channels available to households help to insulate household consumption from shocks to wages. We find the same pattern in inequality trends when we look over the life cycle of households as we do over time in the economy. Additionally we find that there are notable differences in the inequality trends for wages and hours between men and women over this period.

Changes in living arrangements induced by differences in labor market opportunities in neighboring regions have resulted in significant differences in psychological well-being among the older adults. The findings point to the need for attention to the mental health of elderly parents left behind in less economically developed regions.

In this article, we analyse the dynamics of intra-household allocations using unique panel data on individual-specific consumption expenditures and time used for leisure, market production, and home production. Cross-sectional differences at the time of marriage in expected wage profiles between a husband and wife strongly affect the allocation of private consumption expenditures and time use by households in the cross section. There are substantial gender asymmetries in these allocations. Even for households where the husband and wife have identical wages, the private consumption expenditures for the wife are about half those for the husband. Within a given household over time, shocks to wages lead households to shift the relative weights in favour of the spouse receiving the favourable shock. Additionally, we find that households adjust the weights in response to large but not to small shocks; the adjustment to the weights is twice as large in the year leading up to a divorce; and adjustments are more frequent in dual- than in single-earner households. We interpret the data using a dynamic collective model of the household with potentially limited commitment.