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What happens when people witness others experiencing outcomes which, they believe, are undeserved? This question was addressed in an experiment that tested the prediction that (a) third‐party witnesses of unfair events, especially those with a strong belief in a just world, experience distress that (b) is reduced if they are afforded the opportunity to explain the causes of the unfair events. Sixteen vignettes that varied in the fairness of their outcomes were presented to 183 participants who expressed either a strong or weak belief in a just world. After reading each vignette, some participants were asked to provide a detailed causal analysis of the event, while other participants were neither encouraged nor given the opportunity to engage in causal analysis. As predicted, only those participants who manifested a strong belief in a just world and who made causal attributions exhibited a reduced level of distress about the event outcomes. Strong believers were not only somewhat more distressed by examples of unfairness but, unexpectedly, by instances of fairness as well. They also reported lower levels of distress following causal analysis of both fair and unfair outcomes. The results suggest that strong believers in a just world, as compared with weak believers, may manifest a distinctive attributional style that is activated when they encounter event outcomes in which issues of justice are clearly implicated. Upon learning about these events and their outcomes, believers in a just world may have a greater need to understand their causes regardless of the fairness of the outcome, experience more distress when prevented from achieving a causal understanding, and show more relief when allowed to do so. No specific attributions (e.g. the influence of others, personal dispositions, God, luck) were found to be more distress‐reducing than others.

Three experiments identified conditions under which trait judgments made about a behavior were more likely to influence later judgments of the behavior. In Experiment 1, participants made trait judgments about numerous behaviors presented with photos of actors. Some behaviors were repeated, paired with the same or a different actor. All repeated behaviors were judged faster than new behaviors. Facilitation was greatest when repeated behaviors were paired with the same actor, suggesting greater influence of prior judgments in this condition. Experiments 2 and 3 replicated this effect, and the pattern of response times (RTs) suggested a stronger association between the actor and behavior when a prior impression of the actor had been formed (Experiment 2) and when the behavior was stereotypic of the actor's group (Experiment 3). Level of prejudice moderated RT patterns in Experiment 3. Implications for context effects, the nature of trait inferences, and stereotype change are discussed.

It has been argued that competing political campaigns should be evaluated in tandem because of synergies between them. In 2 experiments, participants received biographical information about 2 candidates followed by 6 ads from the candidates' campaigns. Candidates engaged in either a positive (i.e., focus on the positives of the candidate) or a negative (i.e., focus on the negatives of the candidate's opponent) campaign. As predicted, competing positive campaigns produced relatively high evaluations of both candidates, whereas competing negative campaigns produced relatively low evaluations (consistent with the creation of approach-approach and avoidanceavoidance conflicts, respectively). For a synergistic interpretation, a candidate sharing a participant's ideology was denigrated for using a negative campaign only when their opponent also was negative, whereas the opposing ideology candidate was bolstered by using a positive campaign only when the shared ideology candidate was also positive.An important domain for the study of judgment and choice involves the selection between candidates for political office. This domain is particularly interesting for a variety of reasons. The American two-party system effectively ensures that most elections in this country are dichotomous choices, with few or no practical alternatives to the candidates presented by the two major parties. As a result, individuals are presented with a situation in which they can seek out few, if any, effective alternatives to the two initially presented (whereas, for example, in purchasing a new car, a person can usually seek out several additional choice alternatives). Further, in contemporary American political choice, the alternatives (the candidates) have their presentations to decision makers (the voters) molded, not only by their own campaign strategies, but also by the campaign strategies of their opponents.

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