Adverse drug reactions (ADRs) are noxious and unexpected effects during normal drug therapy. They have caused significant clinical burden and been responsible for a large portion of new drug development failure. Molecular understanding and in silico evaluation of drug (or candidate) safety in laboratory is thus so desired, and unfortunately has been largely hindered by misuse of ADR terms. The growing impact of bioinformatics and systems biology in toxicological research also requires a specialized ADR term system that works beyond a simple glossary. Adverse Drug Reaction Classification System (ADReCS; http://bioinf.xmu.edu.cn/ADReCS) is a comprehensive ADR ontology database that provides not only ADR standardization but also hierarchical classification of ADR terms. The ADR terms were pre-assigned with unique digital IDs and at the same time were well organized into a four-level ADR hierarchy tree for building an ADR–ADR relation. Currently, the database covers 6544 standard ADR terms and 34 796 synonyms. It also incorporates information of 1355 single active ingredient drugs and 134 022 drug–ADR pairs. In summary, ADReCS offers an opportunity for direct computation on ADR terms and also provides clues to mining common features underlying ADRs.

Geographical routing protocols have several desirable features for use in ad hoc and sensor networks but are susceptible to voids and localization errors. Virtual coordinate systems are an alternative solution to geographically based routing protocols that works by overlaying a coordinate system on the sensors relative to well chosen reference points. VC is resilient to localization errors; however, we show that it is vulnerable to different forms of the void problem and have no viable complementary approach to overcome them. Specifically, we show that there are instances when packets reach nodes with no viable next hop nodes in the forwarding set. In addition, it is possible for nodes with the same coordinates to arise at different points in the network in the presence of voids. This paper identifies and analyzes these problems. It also compares several existing routing protocols based on Virtual Coordinate systems. Finally, it presents a new routing algorithm that uses backtracking to overcome voids to achieve high connectivity in the greedy phase, higher overall path quality and more resilience to localization errors. We show these properties using extensive simulation analysis.

In this paper, we consider the security of geographic routing (GR) protocols. In GR, neighbors exchange their location information. Based on this information, a node forwards packets to the neighbor that is closest to the destination. Although GR is widely used in ad hoc and wireless sensor networks, its security has rarely been studied; there are a number of attacks that are possible on GR. In one attack, misbehaving nodes can falsify their location information. Also, malicious nodes can drop packets that they need to forward towards the destination. The first contribution of the paper is to propose a location verification algorithm to address the attacks falsifying the location information. The second contribution of the paper is to propose approaches for trust-based multi-path routing, aiming to defeat attacks on GR. We discuss the proposed approaches in detail, outlining possible attacks and defenses against them. In addition, we show, via simulation, how trust-based route selection is able to circumvent attackers and route around them. This paper summarizes and extends results reported by the authors in a previous article

In this paper, we consider the security of geographical forwarding (GF) -a class of algorithms widely used in ad hoc and sensor networks. In GF, neighbors exchange their location information, and a node forwards packets to the destination by picking a neighbor that moves the packet closer to the destination. There are a number of attacks that are possible on geographic forwarding. One of the attacks is predicated on misbehaving nodes falsifying their location information. The first contribution of the paper is to propose a location verification algorithm that addresses this problem. The second contribution of the paper is to propose approaches for route authentication and trust-based route selection to defeat attacks on the network. We discuss the proposed approaches in detail, outlining possible attacks and defenses against them.

Abstract-Geographic routing provides relatively good performance at a much lower overhead than conventional routing protocols such as AODV. However, the performance of these protocols is impacted by physical voids, and localization errors. Accordingly, virtual coordinate systems (VCS) were proposed as an alternative approach that is resilient to localization errors and that naturally routes around physical voids. However, we show that VCS is vulnerable to different forms of the void problem and the performance of greedy routing on VCS is worse than that of geographic forwarding. We show that these anomalies are due to the integral nature of VCS, which causes quantization noise in the estimate of connectivity and node location. We propose an aligned virtual coordinate system (AVCS) on which the greedy routing success can be significantly improved. With our approach, and for the first time, we show that greedy routing on VCS out-performs that on physical coordinate systems even in the absence of localization errors. We compare AVCS against some of the most popular geographical routing protocols both on physical coordinate system and the virtual coordinate systems and show that AVCS significantly improves performance over the best known solutions.