Abstract-RFID (Radio Frequency IDentification) tags need to include security functions, yet at the same time their resources are extremely limited. Moreover, to provide privacy, authentication and protection against tracking of RFID tags without loosing the system scalability, a public-key based approach is inevitable. In this paper, we present an architecture of a state-of-the-art processor for RFID tags with an Elliptic Curve (EC) processor over GF(2 163 ). It shows the plausibility of meeting both security and efficiency requirements even in a passive RFID tag. The proposed processor is able to perform EC scalar multiplications as well as general modular arithmetic (additions and multiplications) which are needed for the cryptographic protocols. As we work with large numbers, the register file is the most critical component in the architecture. By combining several techniques, we are able to reduce the number of registers from 9 to 6 in the EC processor. To obtain an efficient modulo arithmetic, we introduce a redundant modular operation. Moreover, the proposed architecture can support multiple cryptographic protocols. The synthesis results with a 0.13 µm CMOS technology show that the gate area of the most compact version is 12.5 Kgates.

Major salivary glands of both humans and rodents consist of three pairs of macroscopic glands: parotid, submandibular, and sublingual. These glands secrete serous, mucous or mixed saliva via the proper main excretory ducts connecting the glandular bodies with the oral cavity. A series of discoveries about the salivary ducts in the 17th century by Niels Stensen (1638–1686), Thomas Wharton (1614–1673), and Caspar Bartholin (1655–1738) established the concept of exocrine secretion as well as salivary glands. Recent investigations have revealed the endocrine functions of parotin and a variety of cell growth factors produced by salivary glands.The present review aims to describe macroscopic findings on the major salivary glands of rodents and the microscopic differences between those of humans and rodents, which review should be of interest to those researchers studying salivary glands.

Abstract. This paper proposes a new fault-based attack called the Fault Sensitivity Analysis (FSA) attack, which unlike most existing faultbased analyses including Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) does not use values of faulty ciphertexts. Fault sensitivity means the critical condition when a faulty output begins to exhibit some detectable characteristics, e.g., the clock frequency when fault operation begins to occur. We explain that the fault sensitivity exhibits sensitive-data dependency and can be used to retrieve the secret key. This paper presents two practical FSA attacks against two AES hardware implementations on SASEBO-R, PPRM1-AES and WDDL-AES. Different from previous work, we show that WDDL-AES is not perfectly secure against setup-time violation attacks. We also discuss a masking technique as a potential countermeasure against the proposed fault-based attack.

This work describes a low-cost Public-Key Cryptography (PKC) based solution for security services such as key-distribution and authentication as required for wireless sensor networks. We propose a custom hardware assisted approach to implement Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) in order to obtain stronger cryptography as well as to minimize the power. Our compact and low-power ECC processor contains a Modular Arithmetic Logic Unit (MALU) for ECC field arithmetic. The best solution features 6718 gates for the MALU and control unit (data memory not included) in 0.13 μm CMOS technology over the field F 2 131 , which provides a reasonable level of security for the time being. In this case the consumed power is less than 30 μW when operating frequency is 500 kHz.

Abstract. At CHES 2010 two powerful new attacks were presented, namely the Fault Sensitivity Analysis and the Correlation Collision Attack. This paper shows how these ideas can be combined to create even stronger attacks. Two solutions are presented; both extract leakage information by the fault sensitivity analysis method while each one applies a slightly different collision attack to deduce the secret information without the need of any hypothetical leakage model. Having a similar fault injection method, one attack utilizes the non-uniform distribution of faulty ciphertext bytes while the other one exploits the data-dependent timing characteristics of the target combination circuit. The results when attacking several AES ASIC cores of the SASEBO LSI chips in different process technologies are presented. Successfully breaking the cores protected against DPA attacks using either gate-level countermeasures or logic styles indicates the strength of the attacks.