The paper is aimed at investigating the capabilities of social entrepreneurship (SE) firms and how they achieve competitive advantage while engaging in social value creation. We employ a business model perspective to understand the (self-) sustaining mechanism for social good. We carry out an in-depth investigation of three social entrepreneurship (SE) ventures. We analyze the history of these ventures to determine how they achieved competitive advantage. The cases are analysed based on the internal development in the context of environmental support. We find that SE ventures, like all other organizations, achieve competitive advantage based on available resources such as reputation and network of the founder, managerial experience and other corporate resources within the firm. We also find that the competitive advantage often comes from innovate usagea practice that is reinforced by the support from institutional environment. Based on our analysis, we conclude that distinct capabilities of social businesses help them achieve competitive advantage, and that policy makers should institutionally support these ventures. Our application of a business model perspective in social entrepreneurship is unique, and advances the understanding of social businesses from a strategic management perspective.
This article investigates the microfoundations of different stages of development of dynamic capabilities ( DCs ) in international joint ventures ( IJVs ). We conducted case-based research for three heterogeneous IJVs in the Indian life insurance space. Data collection involved detailed interviews and access to other archival data. Results offer interesting insights on (1) the process of the development of dynamic capabilities and (2) the relative importance of different stages in the development of dynamic capabilities. Sensing and seizing are the two stages in which dynamic capabilities are built, and reconfi guration/transformation is inherently subsumed within the stage of seizing. We also found that broad-spectrum parental contribution across different functions impedes the development of dynamic capability.
O rganizations are entities with an ever increasing degree of complexity (Hall and Tolbert, 2006). The idea of organizational theories is not only to anticipate the structural and agentic antecedents and consequences, but also build metaphors that describe the organizations in particular ways. These metaphors then become composites of different genres of research.
During the seventeenth century, the East India Company (EIC) was a minor power in South Asia, repeatedly defeated in battle. However, this changed rapidly, beginning in the 1750s, as the EIC started projecting power from its coastal enclaves into the interior. One after other, the indigenous powers were defeated and destroyed. This article argues that the EIC’s military success was not merely the result of importing the military institutions that emerged in western Europe: there was no military revolution in early modern South Asia. Rather, the EIC blended imported British military institutions and techniques with South Asia’s indigenous military traditions, creating a hybrid military establishment in which South Asian manpower, animals, and economic resources were crucial. The article focuses on the construction of the EIC’s military establishment by concentrating on three spheres: military technology, manpower management, and logistics.
The Indian economy characterized variously as a slumbering giant, powerful tiger, and the most promising market has witnessed a slowdown, occasional disturbances in the industrial relations space, and attention of the world in the last fi ve years. In this special issue, we raise pertinent questions and present research on multiple dimensions of the dynamic and rapidly changing business environment of India. The suitability of management models and frameworks developed in the North American contexts in emerging markets like India and China is questioned. One example of how the well-established models in the literature on success of international joint ventures were insufficient to explain the success of three international joint ventures in the insurance space in India is presented as case in point. Finally, the nine papers that materially contribute to the theme of this special issue are introduced.
Indian soldiers fought for the British not because the Indian army was integrated with colonial society, and not because of superior British military expertise, but because of British managerial skill. Particularly after 1857, the British succeeded in incorporating sepoys into a professionalized combat organization by constructing ethnic and military identities for groups that were deemed `martial races', and then amalgamating these constructed groups into a regimental system that reinforced pride of race while providing an institutional identity - Edmund Burke's `little platoons' - for the soldiers. Details of uniform differentiated among regiments and introduced distinctions among communities. Different titles and different badges, different ways of winding pugris, or the fact that Gurkha regiments wore caps and hats instead, served to make the Indian army a network of self-referencing organizations that could neither combine for purposes of mutiny nor submerge themselves in a wider whole. That army nevertheless performed effectively in battle until the mass casualties of the First World War destroyed the intricate clan and family networks that had grown within the regiments.
In 1914, the Indian Army was deployed against the enemies of the British Empire. This paper analyses the administrative mechanism as well as the imperial assumptions and attitudes which shaped the recruitment policy of the Indian Army during the First World War. From the late nineteenth century, the Martial Race theory (a bundle of contradictory ideas) shaped the recruitment policy. With certain modifications, this theory remained operational to the first decade of the twentieth century. The construction of the 'martial races' enabled the British to play-off different communities against each other to prevent the emergence of a unified anti-British sentiment among the colonized. During the Great War, faced with the rising demands of manpower, the army was forced to modify the Martial Race theory. However, a conscript army did not emerge in British-India. This was due to imperial policies, the inherent social divisions of Indian society, and because the demands for military manpower remained relatively low in comparison to India's demographic resources. Due to innovations in the theory and praxis of recruitment, the volume of recruitment showed a linear increase from 1914 to 1918, with maximum intensification of recruitment occurring during 1917 and 1918. But as the war ended in November 1918, despite the entry of several new communities, the bulk of the Indian Army still came from the traditional martial races. 1313proportioned humans whereas malarial tropical regions with swamps and marshes, such as Bengal Terai and Arakan, produced unhealthy races. 6 However, the military and intellectual circle's attitude within India, with regard to the inter-linkages between climate and courage of the communities, was ambiguous. Some pointed out that due to the operation of other factors such as discipline, public spirit, or religion, good warriors were also found in the hotter regions. 7 Hence the Kashmiris, despite hailing from a cold mountainous region, were regarded as unmartial. In contrast, one 'martial race' which British officials thought very highly of were the Jat cultivators from eastern Punjab and Delhi-Agra region-which is neither cold nor mountainous. In addition, those Jat peasants who had embraced Sikhism (the British considered it a martial religion) from central Punjab were favoured. Major A. E. Barstow of the 2 nd Battalion of the 11th Sikh Regiment noted in 1928: 'The position of the Jat Sikh, however, is considerably higher than that of his Hindu confrere. This may be attributed partly to the fact that he is a soldier as well as an agriculturist, and partly to the freedom and boldness which he has inherited from the traditions of the Khalsa'. 8 The general belief of the British officers was that peasants make good soldiers and most of the martial races (who happened to be of middle castes) were of peasant stocks. The British administrators believed the rural population of Punjab to be the paragon of virtue and the urban population as 'degenerate' villains. A modern historian writes that the positive v...
Following the rapid collapse of the Mughal Empire after 1707, the Mughal Successor States attempted to modernize their state apparatus and their armies. Both the Indian kingdoms and the British-led East India Company (EIC) attempted the construction of hybrid military organizations. How, then, can one explain the continuous military victories of the EIC? For opening up new dimensions on the military supremacy of the Europeans in Afro-Asia, the analytical tool of Military Synthesis might be more useful than the concept of Military Revolution or Military Evolution. This essay focuses on the period from the 1740s to 1849.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
hi@scite.ai
10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614
Henderson, NV 89052, USA
Copyright © 2024 scite LLC. All rights reserved.
Made with 💙 for researchers
Part of the Research Solutions Family.