Purpose -Increasing empirical evidence suggests organizational actions are not always driven by economic efficiency considerations, contrary to the rational decision making viewpoint dominant in the field. Institutional theory, examining the causes of isomorphism within organizations, provides an alternative viewpoint to the adoption of strategies and practices in managing operations and supply chains. Applications have so far been limited to few topics, such as quality management and adoption of electronic tools. This study aims to contribute to an increased understanding of the theory's explanatory value in the field by presenting central research avenues yet unexplored. Design/methodology/approach -The paper begins with a review of the past institutional theory studies in the field. Important new contexts and research directions are then identified with the aim to increase understanding of how institutional factors operate in the field. Finally, a critical evaluation of empirical data collection and construct formation in the past and future studies is provided. Findings -The paper identifies three major institutional theory related research avenues in the field with a potential for theoretical and practical contributions. Two of these -role of uncertainty and relationships between institutional pressures -serve to contribute to how the theory applies to different operational contexts. The third one recommends a reflection on the role of academia as a source and target of institutional pressures. Originality/value -The discussion, debate and analysis offered is intended to stimulate and drive further institutional theory studies in the field with an increasing scope as well as more refined measurement in empirical work.

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Although the importance of integrating different Green Supply Chain Management (GSCM) activities has been highlighted in the literature, the potential interdependencies between these practices and their performance impacts have not been investigated. The purpose of this study is to examine the collective impact of internal and external GSCM practices on two aspects of environmental performance: environmental impact and environmental cost savings. GSCM is proposed as a collective competency, combining four distinct, but interrelated, sets of practices: environmental management systems, eco design, source reduction and external environmental practices. Using survey data from 138 Omani manufacturing firms and Structural Equation Modelling, we find strong empirical support for the complementarity of GSCM practices. We find a strong positive relationship between the level of collective GSCM competency and the environmental impact achieved. Our findings support the belief that complementarities between GSCM practices lead to better performance. Managers should therefore focus on implementing bundles of GSCM practices rather than searching for individual best practices. We find an indirect, mediated influence on environmental cost savings, which is consistent with previous results in other emerging market contexts.

This article utilizes agency theory to explain maverick buying in governmental agencies, that is, noncompliance to centrally negotiated frame agreements. Traditional agency theory assumes the agent to be an opportunistic self-interest seeker. A complementary view of agency problems portrays man as an honest, yet not fully competent, actor; both agents and principals may be burdened by “honest incompetence.” We apply both perspectives on principal-agent relationships to study maverick buying in government procurement and link agency problems to three governance mechanisms: monitoring, training, and guidance. We find that guidance and training help to reduce governmental employees’ noncompliance, but output monitoring does not. Our findings further indicate that maverick buying is related to goal incongruence and two different types of information asymmetry: Agency problems may arise not only because the agent has information the principal is not aware of but also because the principal may have information the agent is not aware of. Future research in public management using agency theory to study instances of hidden action could benefit from applying a similar dual lens to behaviors previously examined as purely opportunistic.