Research has demonstrated that individuals with generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) hold unhelpful beliefs about worry, uncertainty, and the problem-solving process. Extant writings (e.g., treatment manuals) also suggest that other types of maladaptive beliefs may characterize those with GAD. However, these other beliefs have received limited empirical attention and are not an explicit component of cognitive theories of GAD. The present study examined the extent to which dysfunctional attitudes, early maladaptive schemas, and broad self-focused and other-focused beliefs explain significant variance in GAD symptoms, over and above negative and positive beliefs about worry, negative beliefs about uncertainty, and negative beliefs about problems. N = 138 participants classified into Probable GAD and Non-GAD groups completed self-report measures. After controlling for trait anxiety and depressive symptoms, only beliefs about worry, negative beliefs about uncertainty, and schemas reflecting unrelenting standards (e.g., "I must meet all my responsibilities all the time"), the need to self-sacrifice (e.g., "I'm the one who takes care of others"), and less positive views of other people and their intentions (e.g., lower endorsement of views such as "other people are fair"), were unique correlates of Probable GAD versus Non-GAD or GAD severity. Theoretical and clinical implications are discussed.
Although numerous studies have provided support for the notion that intolerance of uncertainty plays a key role in pathological worry (the hallmark feature of generalized anxiety disorder (GAD)), other uncertainty-related constructs may also have relevance for the understanding of individuals who engage in pathological worry. Three constructs from the social cognition literature, causal uncertainty, causal importance, and self-concept clarity, were examined in the present study to assess the degree to which these explain unique variance in GAD, over and above intolerance of uncertainty. N = 235 participants completed self-report measures of trait worry, GAD symptoms, and uncertainty-relevant constructs. A subgroup was subsequently classified as low in GAD symptoms (n = 69) or high in GAD symptoms (n = 54) based on validated cut scores on measures of trait worry and GAD symptoms. In logistic regressions, only elevated intolerance of uncertainty and lower self-concept clarity emerged as unique correlates of high (vs. low) GAD symptoms. The possible role of self-concept uncertainty in GAD and the utility of integrating social cognition theories and constructs into clinical research on intolerance of uncertainty are discussed.
Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD) is characterized by excessive, uncontrollable worry and is associated with cognitive and emotional difficulties including threat interpretation bias (IB). Worry, especially in a verbal mode, has been shown to cause a temporary restriction in working memory (WM). This study examined the effects of verbal and image-based worry on WM, whether the effect of worry on WM accounts for IB in persons with GAD, and the degree to which WM correlates with cognitive and emotional processes associated with GAD. At baseline, participants (N = 32) with GAD completed questionnaires assessing worry, and related processes, and WM and IB tasks. Participants were then trained to worry in verbal or imagery form, per Leigh and Hirsch (2011), and completed WM and IB tasks a second time. At baseline, in the absence of induced worry, lower WM was related to greater emotion dysregulation, intolerance of uncertainty, negative problem orientation, and lower attentional control. Induced worry, regardless of the form, did not significantly affect WM or IB.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.