Hardly a day goes by without another legal controversy somewhere in the world regarding the regulation or suppression of hate speech. The problem is not only topical and current, it is increasingly problematic. Hatred, racism, xenophobia and related forms of intolerance have gone global, moving from promoting hatred against individuals and groups within states, to singling out these groups for discriminatory and differential treatment everywhere. The globalization of hatred includes the additional feature of terrorist activity—the use of hate propaganda in recruitment efforts, the expansion of target groups, and the specific targeting of human rights defenders for violence and harassment. At the same time, the use of the Internet to incite violent crime and promote hatred has increased exponentially in the past 15 years. On the one hand, there is the marketplace of ideas approach, which posits that the solution for the hate speech problem is more speech. It flies in the face of the lived reality of victims of hate propaganda (such as survivors of genocide and other mass human rights violations) who understand that expression in an unregulated marketplace of ideas is used to the detriment of the search for the truth by undermining rationality and promoting deadly forms of intolerance, prejudice and violence. On the other hand, others are calling for increased limits on expression including the introduction of blasphemy laws to protect certain religious ideas from criticism, even when those ideas may promote hatred. The paper argues that the debate should be framed in terms of equality of citizenship, protection of speech rights for minorities and prevention of harm to individuals, not ideas. At the same time, a non-discriminatory understanding on the limits of expression must be found that avoids privileging of certain cultural and racial perspectives in the marketplace of ideas. The challenge is to develop protection for freedom of expression informed by principles of human dignity, equality and the prevention of harm. The Canadian Supreme Court has developed a unique and important jurisprudence in this area which should be considered.

ImportanceThe prevalence of urinary tract infection (UTI), bacteremia, and bacterial meningitis in febrile infants with SARS-CoV-2 is largely unknown. Knowledge of the prevalence of these bacterial infections among febrile infants with SARS-CoV-2 can inform clinical decision-making.ObjectiveTo describe the prevalence of UTI, bacteremia, and bacterial meningitis among febrile infants aged 8 to 60 days with SARS-CoV-2 vs without SARS-CoV-2.Design, Setting, and ParticipantsThis multicenter cross-sectional study was conducted as part of a quality improvement initiative at 106 hospitals in the US and Canada. Participants included full-term, previously healthy, well-appearing infants aged 8 to 60 days without bronchiolitis and with a temperature of at least 38 °C who underwent SARS-CoV-2 testing in the emergency department or hospital between November 1, 2020, and October 31, 2022. Statistical analysis was performed from September 2022 to March 2023.ExposuresSARS-CoV-2 positivity and, for SARS-CoV-2–positive infants, the presence of normal vs abnormal inflammatory marker (IM) levels.Main Outcomes and MeasuresOutcomes were ascertained by medical record review and included the prevalence of UTI, bacteremia without meningitis, and bacterial meningitis. The proportion of infants who were SARS-CoV-2 positive vs negative was calculated for each infection type, and stratified by age group and normal vs abnormal IMs.ResultsAmong 14 402 febrile infants with SARS-CoV-2 testing, 8413 (58.4%) were aged 29 to 60 days; 8143 (56.5%) were male; and 3753 (26.1%) tested positive. Compared with infants who tested negative, a lower proportion of infants who tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 had UTI (0.8% [95% CI, 0.5%-1.1%]) vs 7.6% [95% CI, 7.1%-8.1%]), bacteremia without meningitis (0.2% [95% CI, 0.1%-0.3%] vs 2.1% [95% CI, 1.8%-2.4%]), and bacterial meningitis (<0.1% [95% CI, 0%-0.2%] vs 0.5% [95% CI, 0.4%-0.6%]). Among infants aged 29 to 60 days who tested positive for SARS-CoV-2, 0.4% (95% CI, 0.2%-0.7%) had UTI, less than 0.1% (95% CI, 0%-0.2%) had bacteremia, and less than 0.1% (95% CI, 0%-0.1%) had meningitis. Among SARS-CoV-2–positive infants, a lower proportion of those with normal IMs had bacteremia and/or bacterial meningitis compared with those with abnormal IMs (<0.1% [0%-0.2%] vs 1.8% [0.6%-3.1%]).Conclusions and RelevanceThe prevalence of UTI, bacteremia, and bacterial meningitis was lower for febrile infants who tested positive for SARS-CoV-2, particularly infants aged 29 to 60 days and those with normal IMs. These findings may help inform management of certain febrile infants who test positive for SARS-CoV-2.

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This paper discusses the author’s personal experiences as the chief negotiator of the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement for the Assembly of First Nations. She discusses the key and central role the AFN played in the formulation of the Settlement Agreement, the values and principles that informed the Assembly’s positions and strategies, and some of the behind-the-scene steps that led to its rapid adoption. She argues that reconciliation is a long-term project that will require more than reparations and that Canada must take the major responsibility for creating conditions for reconciliation, which it is not presently doing. She argues that the legal profession and the law must be more context sensitive and take Aboriginal laws and values into account or justice to the Aboriginal population will never be achieved.

INTRODUCTION Constitutional law can be many things, but most of all it can be an agent of change. Ultimately, it determines the way we organize our lives, socially and politically. It provides us with insights to help us understand and define our society and where it is heading. It is intimately concerned with giving meaning to ourselves and our relations with others.' But on their own, constitutional guarantees are abstract concepts. They require judges, through their interpretations, to breathe life into them. The act of giving meaning to a constitutional guarantee, such as freedom of expression, requires an examination of its context, purposes, history, precedent, and the intent of the framers. 2 But guarantees are always open to competing interpretations because usually the sources themselves require interpretation. A reliance on one interpretation involves the suppression of another. It is at this juncture where we find either explicit or implicit reliance on the ways in which the interpreter imagines social and political life. This becomes

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