What is the basic structure of emotional experience and how is it represented in the human brain? One highly influential theory, discrete basic emotions, proposes a limited set of basic emotions such as happiness and fear, which are characterized by unique physiological and neural profiles. Although many studies using diverse methods have linked particular brain structures with specific basic emotions, evidence from individual neuroimaging studies and from neuroimaging meta-analyses has been inconclusive regarding whether basic emotions are associated with both consistent and discriminable regional brain activations. We revisited this question, using activation likelihood estimation (ALE), which allows spatially sensitive, voxelwise statistical comparison of results from multiple studies. In addition, we examined substantially more studies than previous meta-analyses. The ALE meta-analysis yielded results consistent with basic emotion theory. Each of the emotions examined (fear, anger, disgust, sadness, and happiness) was characterized by consistent neural correlates across studies, as defined by reliable correlations with regional brain activations. In addition, the activation patterns associated with each emotion were discrete (discriminable from the other emotions in pairwise contrasts) and overlapped substantially with structure-function correspondences identified using other approaches, providing converging evidence that discrete basic emotions have consistent and discriminable neural correlates. Complementing prior studies that have demonstrated neural correlates for the affective dimensions of arousal and valence, the current meta-analysis results indicate that the key elements of basic emotion views are reflected in neural correlates identified by neuroimaging studies.

Anxiety disorders constitute a sizeable worldwide health burden with profound social and economic consequences. The symptoms are wide-ranging; from hyperarousal to difficulties with concentrating. This latter effect falls under the broad category of altered cognitive performance which is the focus of this review. Specifically, we examine the interaction between anxiety and cognition focusing on the translational threat of unpredictable shock paradigm; a method previously used to characterize emotional responses and defensive mechanisms that is now emerging as valuable tool for examining the interaction between anxiety and cognition. In particular, we compare the impact of threat of shock on cognition in humans to that of pathological anxiety disorders. We highlight that both threat of shock and anxiety disorders promote mechanisms associated with harm avoidance across multiple levels of cognition (from perception to attention to learning and executive function)—a “hot” cognitive function which can be both adaptive and maladaptive depending upon the circumstances. This mechanism comes at a cost to other functions such as working memory, but leaves some functions, such as planning, unperturbed. We also highlight a number of cognitive effects that differ across anxiety disorders and threat of shock. These discrepant effects are largely seen in “cold” cognitive functions involving control mechanisms and may reveal boundaries between adaptive (e.g., response to threat) and maladaptive (e.g., pathological) anxiety. We conclude by raising a number of unresolved questions regarding the role of anxiety in cognition that may provide fruitful avenues for future research.

Anxiety impairs the ability to think and concentrate, suggesting that the interaction between emotion and cognition may elucidate the debilitating nature of pathological anxiety. Using a verbal n-back task that parametrically modulated cognitive load, we explored the effect of experimentally-induced anxiety on task performance and the startle reflex. Findings suggest there is a crucial inflection point between moderate and high cognitive load, where resources shift from anxious apprehension to focus on task demands. Specifically, we demonstrate that anxiety impairs performance under low-load, but is reduced when subjects engage in a difficult task that occupies executive resources. We propose a two-component model of anxiety that describes a cognitive mechanism behind performance impairment and an automatic response that supports sustained anxiety-potentiated startle. Implications for therapeutic interventions and emotional pathology are discussed.

Functionally, anxiety serves to increase vigilance towards aversive stimuli and improve the ability to detect and avoid danger. We have recently shown, for instance, that anxiety increases the ability to a) detect and b) instigate defensive responses towards aversive and not appetitive face stimuli in healthy individuals. This is arguably the key adaptive function of anxiety, yet the neural circuitry underlying this valence-specific effect is unknown. In the present translational study, we sought evidence for the proposition that dorsomedial regions of the prefrontal (DMPFC) and cingulate cortex constitute the human homologue of the rodent prelimbic and are thus associated with increased amygdala responding during this adaptive threat bias in anxiety. To this end, we applied a novel functional connectivity analysis to healthy subjects (N=20) identifying the emotion of fearful and happy faces in an fMRI scanner under anxious (threat of unpredictable foot shock) and non-anxious (safe) conditions. We showed that anxiety significantly increased positive DMPFC-amygdala connectivity during the processing of fearful faces. This effect was a) valence-specific (it was not seen for happy faces), b) paralleled by faster behavioral response to fearful faces, and c) correlated positively with trait anxiety. As such we provide the first experimental support for an anxiety-mediated, valence-specific, DMPFC-amygdala aversive amplification mechanism in healthy humans. This may be homologous to the rodent prelimbic-amygdala circuit and may, given the relationship with trait anxiety, underlie vulnerability to anxiety disorders. This study thus pinpoints a key neural mechanism in adaptive anxiety and highlights its potential link to maladaptive anxiety.

Anxiety can be distracting, disruptive, and incapacitating. Despite problems with empirical replication of this phenomenon, one fruitful avenue of study has emerged from working memory (WM) experiments where a translational method of anxiety induction (risk of shock) has been shown to disrupt spatial and verbal WM performance. Performance declines when resources (e.g., spatial attention, executive function) devoted to goal-directed behaviors are consumed by anxiety. Importantly, it has been shown that anxiety-related impairments in verbal WM depend on task difficulty, suggesting that cognitive load may be an important consideration in the interaction between anxiety and cognition. Here we use both spatial and verbal WM paradigms to probe the effect of cognitive load on anxiety-induced WM impairment across task modality. Subjects performed a series of spatial and verbal n-back tasks of increasing difficulty (1, 2, and 3-back) while they were safe or at risk for shock. Startle reflex was used to probe anxiety. Results demonstrate that induced-anxiety differentially impacts verbal and spatial WM, such that low and medium-load verbal WM is more susceptible to anxiety-related disruption relative to high-load, and spatial WM is disrupted regardless of task difficulty. Anxiety impacts both verbal and spatial processes, as described by correlations between anxiety and performance impairment, albeit the effect on spatial WM is consistent across load. Demanding WM tasks may exert top-down control over higher-order cortical resources engaged by anxious apprehension, however high-load spatial WM may continue to experience additional competition from anxiety-related changes in spatial attention, resulting in impaired performance. By describing this disruption across task modalities, these findings inform current theories of emotion–cognition interactions and may facilitate development of clinical interventions that seek to target cognitive impairments associated with anxiety.

No abstract

Background We have delineated, across four prior studies, the role of positive dorsal medial prefrontal/anterior cingulate cortex (dmPFC/ACC)-amygdala circuit coupling during aversive processing in healthy individuals under stress. This translational circuit, termed the ‘aversive amplification circuit’, is thought to drive adaptive, harm-avoidant behavior in threatening environments. Here, in a natural progression of this prior work, we confirm that this circuit also plays a role in the pathological manifestation of anxiety disorders. Methods Forty-five unmedicated participants (N=22 generalized and social anxiety disorder/N=23 controls) recruited from Washington DC metropolitan area completed a simple emotion identification task during functional magnetic resonance imaging at the National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, MD, USA. Findings As predicted, a diagnosis by valence interaction was seen in whole-brain amygdala connectivity within the dmPFC/ACC clusters identified in our prior study; driven by significantly greater circuit coupling during fearful versus happy face processing in anxious, but not healthy, participants. Critically, and in accordance with contemporary theoretical approaches to psychiatry, circuit coupling correlated positively with self-reported anxious symptoms, providing evidence of a continuous circuit-subjective symptomatology relationship. Interpretation We track the functional role of a single neural circuit from its involvement in adaptive threat-biases under stress, to its chronic engagement in anxiety disorders in the absence of experimentally induced stress. Thus, we uniquely map a mood and anxiety related circuit across its adaptive and maladaptive stages. Clinically, this may provide a step towards a more mechanistic spectrum-based approach to anxiety disorder diagnosis and may ultimately lead to more targeted treatments.

From job interviews to the heat of battle, it is evident that people think and learn differently when stressed. In fact, learning under stress may have long-term consequences; stress facilitates aversive conditioning and associations learned during extreme stress may result in debilitating emotional responses in posttraumatic stress disorder. The mechanisms underpinning such stress-related associations, however, are unknown. Computational neuroscience has successfully characterized several mechanisms critical for associative learning under normative conditions. One such mechanism, the detection of a mismatch between expected and observed outcomes within the ventral striatum (i.e., "prediction errors"), is thought to be a critical precursor to the formation of new stimulusoutcome associations. An untested possibility, therefore, is that stress may affect learning via modulation of this mechanism. Here we combine a translational model of stress with a cognitive neuroimaging paradigm to demonstrate that stress significantly increases ventral striatum aversive (but not appetitive) prediction error signal. This provides a unique account of the propensity to form threat-related associations under stress with direct implications for our understanding of both normal stress and stress-related disorders.threat of shock | punishment | anxiety | face perception L earning to associate cues with threat is adaptive because it allows future threat to be predicted and avoided (1). However, such associative learning also may lead to haunting and debilitating memories; the smell of stir-fry may evoke painful intrusive memories in Vietnam veterans. How aversive information is integrated to guide adaptive or maladaptive behavior, however, is not well understood. Here, we report that stress increases a key learning mechanism: the neural detection of a mismatch between an expected and observed aversive outcome within the ventral striatum, commonly referred to as the aversive prediction error (PE) signal (1, 2).Neurocomputational and neuroeconomic accounts of cognition posit that stimulus-outcome associations during conditioning are formed via temporal difference learning (1, 3, 4), in which learning depends upon comparing expectation to what is currently happening. New associations, it is argued, are driven by a difference between predicted and actual outcomes (i.e., "prediction errors"), with greater mismatch between expected and actual outcomes evoking greater PE, resulting in greater predictive learning. This mismatch gives rise to phasic dopamine release in the ventral striatum (1, 3-5) for both appetitive and aversive stimuli (1, 2, 6, 7). Little is known, however, about how PE processing might be affected by an organism's emotional state. Stress, for instance, is well known to facilitate aversive conditioning in both humans and animals (8, 9), raising the possibility that aversive PEs also might be increased by stress. This hypothesis, however, is untested. Therefore, here we used a translational stress induction method in healt...