No abstract

Catholic social thought (CST) has obvious resonance with universal basic income proposals, due to the tradition's insistence on basic needs as human rights, comfort with government redistribution, and preference for programs that promote the agency of individuals and local communities, among other similarities. However, some CST scholars believe basic income challenges dearly held values of the tradition. This essay examines both views, concluding that basic income can comport with CST's view of work, correctly understood.

Economic inequality, particularly in the areas of income and wealth, has been steadily expanding in the United States. This reality is an issue for other nations as well. This article examines reasons why economic inequality deserves more attention from moral theologians. It also reviews recent literature on the topic and the need to restore equality of opportunity as a genuine aspect of American life.

This essay presents Augustine as a rich ethical resource on issues of wealth and poverty. Contrary to prevalent views that he had little to say on issues of economic justice, Augustine decries wealth as morally dangerous, promotes the agency of the poor in advocating for themselves with the wealthy, and supports distributive justice. Augustine envisions an interdependent Christian community where the wealthy not only help the poor, but rely on the poor to help them achieve salvation by “bearing their goods to heaven,” as Augustine describes the receipt of alms. Augustine's view of wealth's moral danger is an apt resource for ethicists interested in virtue. His insistence on poor people's moral agency and interdependence among poor and wealthy speak to pressing issues of justice in today's unequal societies.

In Catholic social thought (CST), work that is exploitative, immoral, or hopelessly monotonous can be labeled alienating: its performance makes the worker a stranger to her own, God-given human nature. CST traditionally understands sex work, which directs the human sexual faculties to ends other than the unitive and procreative, as a paradigmatic example of alienating work, and this paper will not disagree. Instead, I will show how accepting sex worker advocates’ claim that “sex work is work” reveals that while sex work is indeed alienating by CST’s standards, many forms of paid work available today are alienating in similar ways. Listening to sex worker advocates helps CST strengthen its critique of alienating work while acknowledging sex workers’ moral agency.