Artykuł stanowi próbę odpowiedzi na pytanie, czy posiadanie na potrzeby swoich praktyk religijnych środka odurzającego (konkretnie konopi), jest dozwolone w świetle przepisów konstytucyjnych gwarantujących wolność sumienia i religii, prawo do uzewnętrzniania swojej religii przez uprawianie kultu, modlitwę i uczestniczenie w obrzędach oraz zakazujących zmuszania do nieuczestniczenia w obrzędach religijnych. Wolność sumienia nie jest pojęciem tożsamym z wolnością praktykowania określonej religii. Z brzmienia Konstytucji wynika, iż wolność uzewnętrzniania przekonań może zostać ograniczona ze względu na m.in. zdrowie, moralność czy porządek publiczny. W konsekwencji Autorka zajmuje stanowisko, iż wolność religii jest co prawda ważna w katalogu praw i wolności człowieka, ale jej część w postaci uzewnętrzniania przekonań musi niejednokrotnie ustąpić przed dobrem wyższego rzędu. Stąd konstatacja, iż brak jest podstaw do uznawania procesu celowego wprawiania się w stan odurzenia za kult religijny korzystający z ochrony konstytucyjnej.
In the judgment of 11 June 2020, the Court of Justice of the European Union took the position that it is not contradictory to the community regulations for courts to decide, on a case-by-case basis, whether or not in a specific case the quantity of drugs possessed by the offender is significant and therefore the penalty should be made more severe. The interpretation of the concept of a ‘significant quantity’ of drugs may be left for the national courts to decide on a case-by-case basis on condition that this interpretation is reasonably foreseeable. This article presents an opinion in the discussion of the problems generated by the concept of significant quantities of narcotic drugs in the Polish criminal law, as specified in article 62(2) of the Act on Counteracting Drug Addiction of 29 July 2005. Most of all, however, the doubts that the judgment of the Court of Justice may raise in the context of the Polish legal order and recognised (and very diverse) case-law.
The focus of this article is the regulation of Article 62(1) of the Act on Counteracting Drug Addiction of 29 July 2005, often referred to in literature as ‘possession for personal use’. The fundamental issue related to the subject matter pertains to the definition of the legal good in Art. 62(1) of the Act. Contrary to initial impressions, identifying this interest is neither simple nor unequivocal, as there may be doubts over whether such a good protected by law exists and, if so, whether it should be protected under criminal law. The article also explores the correlation of this legal good and the need to protect it with other legal goods protected by the Constitution (e.g. individual freedom). Additionally, the article also examines the significance of the consent of a holder of a given good for the exclusion of unlawfulness or the absence of any attack on the legal good. Behaviour undertaken with the consent of the holder, allegedly “violating” the legal good, is after all, an act that conforms to the norm from the outset, and therefore does not involve any element of unlawfulness. As such, it does not constitute a criminal act. There are doubts whether in the case of possession and use of drugs, there is a threat to the legal good or whether such conduct is lawful from the very beginning, given the consumer’s consent. The article critiques the existing criminal law regulations, and its key argument is the thesis that drug addiction is an issue of exclusively medical and social concern, rather than one of criminal law.
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