No abstract

No abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract This paper uses a theoretical model with Directed Technical Change to analyse the observed heterogeneous energy intensity developments. Based on the empirical evidence on the underlying drivers of energy intensity developments, we decompose changes in aggregate energy intensity into structural changes in the economy (Sector Effect) and within-sector energy efficiency improvements (Efficiency Effect). We analyse how energy price growth and the relative productivity of both sectors affect the direction of research and hence the relative importance of the aforementioned two effects. The relative importance of these effects is determined by energy price growth and relative sector productivity that drive the direction of research. In economies that are relatively more advanced in sectors with low energy intensities, the Sector Effect dominates energy intensity dynamics given no or moderate energy price growth. In contrast, the Efficiency Effect dominates energy intensity developments in economies with a high relative technological level within their energy-intensive industries if moderate energy price growth is above a certain threshold. We further show that temporal energy price shocks might induce a permanent redirection of innovation activities towards sectors with low-energy intensities. Terms of use: Documents inKeywords: directed technical change, energy efficiency, energy intensity, structural change.JEL-Classification: O33, Q43, Q55. * We thank Jürgen Meckl, Ulf Moslener, Jana Brandt, Lothar Grall, Matthias Greiff, and the participants of the 9th MAGKS Colloquium (Marburg) for fruitful comments.

This paper provides an empirical investigation of misconducts in contests based on data from European football. We extend previous studies by differentiating between dissents with the referee and misconducts directly aimed at sabotaging the competitor. We find that sabotage is more likely committed by teams with lower ability. Dissent is more likely to be shown by teams lagging behind in score and by away teams. We further find that captains engage more in sabotage during important matches and challenge referees' decisions immediately after sanctions of teammates. Finally, we also observe a deterrence effect of sanctions on all types of misconduct.

No abstract

This paper analyses returns to task specialization using a unique panel data set of professional football players in the German Bundesliga. Based on accumulated task-specific human capital, I measure whether a player is rather a specialist in one task or a generalist able to perform several tasks. Using OLS, fixed effects, and quantile regression methods (with individual fixed effects), I analyse the impact of specialization on remuneration. Differentiating by player role in team production, I find that core team members, i.e. starting players, exhibit positive returns to specialization, which increase at higher salary quantiles. In contrast, substitutes, in particular those in the lower half of the conditional salary distribution, seem to benefit from being generalists, which renders them more attractive as substitute players for their teams. The paper discusses implications of the findings for other labour market contexts.

No abstract

No abstract