This article explores why national judges remain passive on EU legal integration by examining judges’ reasons for not requesting preliminary rulings from the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The article combines insights from social psychology and literature on the role of national courts in European integration to formulate expectations regarding what type of motives guide national judges’ behaviours. Drawing on interviews held with Croatian, Slovenian and Swedish judges, our results reveal three shared reasons judges remain passive: referrals are not required by the formal rules (procedural normative motivation), referrals are not made to protect the parties to the case (substantive normative motivation) and referrals are not made to protect judges’ reputations (instrumental motivation). In addition, we unveil motives that are shared by only judges from one or two Member States, such as not referring cases to uphold the capacity of the preliminary ruling procedure (Swedish judges) and not referring cases due to a fear of sanctions and a lack of knowledge and resources (Croatian and Slovenian judges). We discuss these similarities and divergences in light of the theoretical discussion on the role of courts as active or passive actors in EU legal integration.

This article analyzes whether, and if so, why, national inspectorates adopt different enforcement strategies when controlling the provision of welfare services, such as health care, eldercare, and the compulsory school. The findings show that the Swedish Schools Inspectorate uses a predominantly strict strategy, while the Health and Social Care Inspectorate relies on a more situational strategy. To explain this variation in enforcement strategy, the article tests four hypotheses derived from the literature on regulatory enforcement. The findings suggest that the variation between the agencies is not primarily the result of differences in resources or the authority to issue punitive decisions, as suggested by previous research. Instead, we find support for the hypothesis that the definition of quality can explain variation in adopted strategies, and partial support for the hypothesis that differences in regulatory mission can account for a variation in the agencies' formal enforcement strategies.

This article sheds new light on the role of national courts in the preliminary ruling procedure and European integration by examining: (1) whether national courts allow the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) to decide politically sensitive cases and (2) whether national courts frame the cases by expressing support for an integration-friendly interpretation of EU law or by voicing an opinion in defence of the challenged national law. This study shows that the single most common court behaviour is to support legal integration by referring politically sensitive cases and expressing support for EU law. However, by examining the two choices together, this article also uncovers previously untheorised patterns of behaviour. These findings show that the national courts' behaviour is not limited to either supporting or resisting integration. Instead, it is suggested that national courts may regularly contribute to striking a balance between EU integration and member state autonomy. KEYWORDS European legal integration; national courts; the preliminary ruling procedure; Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU); opinions; judicial politics It is undisputed that the involvement of national courts in the preliminary ruling procedure (Article 267 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [TFEU]) has been crucial for the ability of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) to promote legal integration (Weiler 1994;

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This article explores how national judges' reasoning in the preliminary ruling procedure varies depending on the prescriptive clarity of European Union (EU) legal frameworks. Drawing on the logic of appropriateness and the logic of expected consequences, this article formulates hypotheses regarding judges' motivational patterns. Interviews with Swedish judges generate findings that partly corroborate these hypotheses. The findings show that when EU legal frameworks are clear, judges express a mix of considerations, including references to EU rules, expected politico‐strategic outcomes and professional norms. When the clarity of the frameworks is low, judges mainly motivate their decisions by invoking professional norms. In light of these findings, the article proposes a revision of the compliance pull explanation that takes into account how not only formal EU rules but also informal norms of appropriate professional conduct may influence the actions of national judges.

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