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The New Public Governance approach advocates a more flexible and participatory public administration as means to higher efficiency and increase legitimacy. Increasing flexibility and thereby public employees' discretion may, however, pose a risk to equality and impartiality, core values in democratic and rule of law societies. Using a survey among Baltic public employees, this article explores this risk. We ask if public employees' preferences for flexible rule application go hand in hand with accept of bending rules, even if it means a breach of impartiality. We find that this is the case. We also find that in contrary to what the New Public Governance approach expects, neither citizen participation nor generalized trust works as a control on rule bending. On a positive note, however, we find that control mechanisms associated with Weberian Public Administration e.g. meritocratic procedures and coordination lessens the acceptance to bend the rules.

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Citizen's participation is disputed; some see it as enhancing democracy while others see it as undermining representative government. Some find it increases administrative efficiency, others it creates additional costs. Studies argue that the outcome depends on the value which civil servants place on inclusion. Echoing Miles' law, "where you stand depends on where you sit," we discuss how administrative structures and processes-"how you sit"shape civil servants values on citizens' participation. Using survey data from over 1700 civil servants in the Baltic countries, the article contributes by placing the discussion in the context of extreme social change.