The Muscovite. Sweden, Finland and Russia 1478–1721 The great change in European relations with Russia took place in 1478 when Muscovy replaced the trading Republic of Novgorod as a neighbor of Sweden, Livonia and Lithuania. Western Europe was since that year bordering to a bellicose great power with large resources causing dread. The feelings of dread caused by Russia with Czars like Ivan the Terrible became a standing theme in printed matter as well as politics and the image of Russia became very much similar to the image of Turkey, which threatened Europe from South-East. Various, usually rather negative, stereotype expressions characterized the vocabulary of the 16th century. The Peace of Stolbova in 1617 started a period of successive change. The era of Sweden as a Great Power led to growing knowledge about Russia in almost every respect, but it was still based on the already accepted stereotypes. They started, however, typically to seem more diluted and thin with time. The image of Russia as a threat was to a growing extent replaced by an image of a possibility. The perhaps most remarkable but rather unoriginal printed Swedish description of Russia of the era was Regni Muschovotici Sciographia, published by Petrus Petrejus. At the final stage of Sweden’s era as a great power there was a substantial widening but also polarization of the information on Russia. The Russian reform process during Tsar Peter I also began to influence the minds after the turn of the century in 1700. One of the principal describers of this process was Lars Johan Malm (Ehrenmalm), whose large manuscript about the power of the Russian Empire of that time, Några Anmärkningar Angående det Ryska Rijkets Nuvarande Macht from 1714, never reached the printers due to intervention from censors.

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Ülevaade. Kuningas ja lääniülemad avaldasid Rootsis 16. saj alates korraldusi, mida levitati kas rahvakoosolekutel või kirikukantslist ette lugedes. See tava kodifitseeriti 1686. a kirikuseadusega. Korralduste ettelugemine muutus jumalateenistuse osaks ja nende kuulamine oli kõigile kohustuslik. Kuna riigi idaosas Soomes ei osatud rootsi keelt, hakati korraldusi soome keelde tõlkima, mistõttu Rootsi võimuperioodi lõpuks moodustasid sellised tekstid umbes neljandiku kõikidest korraldustest. Selle süsteemi tugisammasteks muutusid Kantseleikolleegiumi juures tegutsenud soomendajad ja kuninglik trükikoda, kellel oli korralduste publitseerimise privileeg. Tekstidest olid kõige tähtsamad 3-4 korda aastas esitatud palvepäevaplakatid, mis sisaldasid aktuaalseid uudiseid kõnealuse kirikupüha jaoks Piibli tekstide valguses. Korraldusi trükiti 17. saj enamasti Turus, kuid 18. saj peamiselt Stockholmis.Korralduste tekstidel on varasemal ajal arvatud olevat suhteliselt vähene tähen-dus soome kirjakeele arengule, mis hakkas 19. saj kulgema purismi suunas, loobudes tollases kultuurkeeles tavalistest rootsipärasustest. Uuemad vana soome kirjakeele uurimused näitavad siiski, et kuulmise järgi omandatud ning tõlkijate loodud uudissõnu ja neologisme oli rahvakeelde kandunud üsnagi suurel määral ja sedakaudu siirdusid nad ka tänapäeva soome keelde. Nõudlus soomekeelsete tekstide järele riigi idaosas ei näita 16.-18. saj mitte soomlaste rahvustunnet, vaid selle aluseks oli hoopis vajadus tagada kõikide inimeste võrdsus seaduse ees. Korraldustel oligi suur ühiskondlik tähtsus laiade rahvakihtide õigustaju arenemise ja seadustetundmise lisandumise seisukohast.

The subjugation of Northern Estonia to Swedish rule in 1561 is described in all general presentations of history, yet by and large, the course of events has not been traced in newer research. This period of history is very remarkable in three aspects. First of all, it was important for Sweden’s political history because over the course of the subsequent hundred years, Sweden became a major power in the Baltic Sea region, in reference to which the expression dominium maris Baltici is used. Secondly, the events of 1561–62 were of local importance because they led to the demise of the State of the Livonian Order in Livonia, which also meant the end of the Middle Ages in that region. The third viewpoint concerning the effect of these events to constitutional law is perhaps even more important. They started the transformation of previously unitary Sweden into a European conglomerate state where in addition to the motherland, there were other distinctive parts with different rights, so called provinces. Only a part of this chain of events will be examined in this study, namely the visit of the Swedish envoys Klas Kristersson Horn, Hans Larsson Björnram and Herman Bruser to Tallinn from March to June of 1561 and the events following this visit after the coronation of the king in Stockholm towards the end of the summer. There is abundant source material related to the deliberations (correspondence, presentations, documents verifying privileges, descriptions of oral conversations) and part of it has been published, but there are many loose ends in this material, first and foremost in regard to questions related to constitutional issues. A completely new picture of the history of the birth of Sweden as a great power emerges as a result of the careful reading of the sources. Unlike later developments, to a great extent the initiative came from Tallinners themselves. Their vision was affected both by the fear of Russia and by the wish to use the opportunities offered by trade with the east. Complete concord prevailed in these matters between the Tallinners and Sweden’s young king Erik XIV. The Harju-Viru knighthood and the nobility of Järvamaa followed the example of Tallinn’s senior magistrates and town council. The vote with acclamation that took place in Tallinn, where the participants chose “with hand and mouth” the king of Sweden as their ruler, was of central importance. This was followed by detailed consultations, where Horn, Björnram and Bruser in accordance with their authorisation agreed to the existing privileges of the corporations. Two separate “acts of recognition” (Huldigung) took place in Tallinn on 4 and 6 June 1951, the content of which was typical in the case of the declaration of the sovereign as ruler. The central elements of these ceremonies were the oath of allegiance and the affirmation of the ruler, ecclesiastical ceremonies and various kinds of expressions of joy. After this, a delegation from the knighthood and the city travelled to Sweden, but they were late (perhaps for diplomatic reasons) for the king’s coronation celebrations held in Uppsala in June of 1561. In this way they did not have to take the oath of allegiance the same way as the Swedes. The final phase of the events took place in audiences with Erik XIV in Stockholm as well as its surrounding area. The promises and the written oaths taken in Tallinn were reviewed on the basis of Sweden’s legal expertise and even though the Swedes were not always satisfied with them, the king affirmed them all the same. He was emphatically benevolent and even approved the privileges presented by the delegations without reading them, asking only whether there was not anything in them contrary to natural law. Thus the privileges of both the knighthood and the city were approved in Norrköping on 2 August 1561. The Riksradet (Council of the Realm) did not participate in making the final decisions and the king also did not request any recommendation from the Riksdag (Sweden’s parliament). Instead, he relied on the permit that Riksdag had already granted to Gustav Vasa in the summer of 1560 “to set foot in Livonia”. The reason as seen from Sweden for incorporating Tallinn and its surrounding region was undoubtedly primarily mercantile. Several features of the policy of Erik XIV, and the selection of envoys (Horn and Björnram) from among persons who knew Russian trade the best, are indicative of this. Yet other reasons also had their effect, for instance state security and the ruler’s ambition and vanity. On the whole, Sweden’s path to becoming a great power can be explained on the basis of the complexity theory and especially the path dependence featured in this theory, where decision-making is limited to the path that has previously been selected. The distinctive feature of the events that took place in Tallinn was the fact that they had the strong support of the city’s inhabitants and that very little military force was used, while on the other hand money was spent liberally to pay for both bribes and awards.

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