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Two experiments tested the absolute sleeper effect predicted by the discounting cue hypothesis. These experiments included strong tests of the hypothesis because 'they (a) demonstrably created the conditions that the theory indicated were necessary for the effect to occur; (b) demonstrably minimized the impact of a force known to countervail against the effect; and (c) employed statistical tests that had adequate power to detect the effect should it occur. In Experiment 1, subjects read one of two persuasive messages accompanied by a discounting cue. All the requirements for a strong test were demonstrably met with one message, and an absolute sleeper effect was obtained when attitudes were measured again after 5 weeks. Not all the requirements for a strong test were met with the other message, and the effect was not obtained. In Experiment 2, subjects read a persuasive message and one of five discounting cues. All the requirements for a strong test were demonstrably met in three cue conditions, and absolute sleeper effects were found in each of them after 6 weeks. Absolute sleeper effects were not observed in the two cue conditions in which the necessary conditions for the effect were not met. It was concluded that absolute sleeper effects can be reliably obtained when all the necessary theoretical conditions are met, a known countervailing force is absent, and the statistical tests have adequate power. A sleeper effect can be denned, in a purely descriptive sense, as any phenomenon that increases in magnitude some time after the presumed causal event has occurred. In persuasion research, the term sleeper effect refers to the finding that a persuasive message has a greater delayed than initial impact on sub-jects' attitudes. The term is most often used more restrictively to refer to the particular delayed increase in attitude change that is predicted from the discounting cue hypothesis (Hovland, Lumsdaine, & Sheffield, 1949). According to this hypothesis, two key processes-discounting and dissociation-are

The history of research on the sleeper effect prior to 1978 can be divided into five stages: (a) initial discovery of the effect, (b) development of the underlying theory, (c) widespread acceptance of the effect and of the discounting cue explanation of it, (d) realization that past operational definitions of the effect were not isomorphic with the conceptual definition, and (e) repeated failures to demonstrate the effect once operational definitions were employed that corresponded to the conceptual definition (Gillig & Greenwald, 1974). These failures resulted in an invitation to accept the null hypothesis and to "lay the sleeper effect to rest." This article illustrates why it is not justifiable to accept the null hypothesis about the sleeper effect. We suggest that provisional acceptance of the null hypothesis depends on assuming that all the necessary theoretical, countervailing, statistical, and procedural conditions for an adequate test of the effect have been demonstrably met. We further suggest that none of the empirical studies prior to 1978 demonstrably succeeded in meeting these conditions. However, adequate tests following the guidelines we have described for provisionally accepting the null hypothesis have recently been conducted, and the effect has been repeatedly found. A deductive model of the logical factors that should guide provisional acceptance of the null hypothesis is contrasted with a current model that stresses induction and statistical power analyses.Most statistics texts assert that there is search findings to be clear about the criteria no formal basis for accepting the null hy-that help distinguish between a conclusion pothesis. The rationale for this assumption such as "We can be reasonably certain that is basically a restatement of the well-known no meaningful difference exists" and a conposition in philosophy that inductive knowl-elusion such as "Although no statistically edge is not logically possible. However, prac-reliable difference was found, we cannot be ticing scientists are often forced to act as at all certain whether a meaningful differthough the null hypothesis were true even ence exists." when they know that there is no compellingThe present article uses the history of epistemological basis for their actions. Given research on the sleeper effect to illustrate the apparent conflict between practice and some pitfalls in accepting the null hypothelogic, it is important in the analysis of re-sis. It also uses this research to describe and justify a model that might help in deciding when no-difference findings warrant the ten-' °a t t h U tative conclusion that no difference exists as C. an B rR ,a a the University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Canada, opposed to the conclusion that no decision The authors would like to thank Anthony G. Green-about differences is warranted. The sleeper wald and Daniel Romer for their comments on a effect is useful for this illustration, since a previous draft of this article^ recent da j m was made ^ ^ effect does Requests for reprints should be se...

How people feel about places matters, especially in their neighborhood. It matters for their health, the health of their children, and their social cohesion and use of local resources. A growing body of research in public health, planning, psychology, and sociology bears out this point. Recently, a new methodological tack has been taken to find out how people feel about places. The sketch map, a once popular tool of behavioral geographers and environmental psychologists to understand how people perceive the structural aspects of places, is now being used in concert with geographic information systems (GIS) to capture and spatially analyze the emotional side of urban environmental perception. This confluence is generating exciting prospects for what we can learn about the characteristics of the urban environment that elicit emotion. However, due to the uncritical way this approach has been employed to date, excitement about the prospects must be tempered by the acknowledgement of its potential problems. In this paper we review the extant research on integrating sketch maps with GIS and then employ a case study of mapping youth fear in Los Angeles gang neighborhoods to demonstrate these prospects and the problems, particularly in the areas of (1) representation of environmental perception in GIS and (2) spatial analysis of these data.

Ⅲ Effectiveness of an integrated trauma-informed approach to treating women with co-occurring disorders and histories of trauma was evaluated. Baseline and 12-month assessments were completed by 136 interventionand 177 comparison-group women. The intervention group received

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Research Summary The civil gang injunction (CGI) is an increasingly popular suppression strategy. Interviews with 416 youth in areas with and without a CGI suggest that suppression‐oriented injunctions may have little useful impact on gang social dynamics. CGIs may have promise as part of a comprehensive strategy that uses enhanced sanctions both to suppress crime and to move individual gang offenders toward alternatives (such as education, personal development, and jobs), allowing them to imagine alternative social identities. Policy Implications Whether CGIs play a positive role in curtailing the activities of street gang members or whether they fuel it instead may depend on policy makers and criminal justice officials ensuring that (a) gang members are approached as individuals, (b) the safety zone is appropriately sized, and (c) police suppression activities are accompanied by gang‐focused social services and a clear, transparent escape clause. Successful implementation depends on multiple city agencies being integrated into the CGI strategy early on.