This paper estimates the dynamic effects of changes in taxes in the United States. We distinguish between changes in personal and corporate income taxes and develop a new narrative account of federal tax liability changes in these two tax components. We develop an estimator which uses narratively identified tax changes as proxies for structural tax shocks and apply it to quarterly post-WWII data. We find that short run output effects of tax shocks are large and that it is important to distinguish between different types of taxes when considering their impact on the labor market and on expenditure components. (JEL E23, E62, H24, H25, H31, H32)

We provide evidence on the dynamic effects of tax liability changes in the United States. We distinguish between surprise and anticipated tax changes. Preannounced but not yet implemented tax cuts give rise to contractions in output, investment, and hours worked while real wages increase. There are no significant anticipation effects on aggregate consumption. Implemented tax cuts, regardless of their timing, have expansionary effects, on output, consumption, investment, hours worked, and real wages. Results are shown to be robust.

We study the effects of fiscal policy interventions in a liquidity trap in a model with nominal rigidities and an interest rate rule. In a liquidity trap caused by a self-fulfilling state of low confidence, higher government spending has deflationary effects that reduce the spending multiplier when the zero lower bound is binding. Instead, cuts in marginal labor tax rates are inflationary and become more expansionary when the zero lower bound is binding. These findings contradict a popular view, based on a liquidity trap caused by a fundamental shock such as a taste shock, that higher government spending is inflationary and can therefore be associated with large multipliers at the zero lower bound, while lower marginal tax rates are deflationary and therefore counterproductive.

and participants at various seminars and conferences for useful comments. Financial support from the Cornell Institute for the Social Sciences is acknowledged. The views in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, the Federal Reserve System, or the National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications.