Forest preservation in Cambodian rural villages is empirically investigated using contingent valuation method. The article’s findings are as follows. First, the participation of local residents in forest preservation differs according to the nature of the relevant activity (i.e., whether it is tree planting, forestry management, or refraining from logging). Second, participation in forest preservation differs according to socioeconomic attributes such as gender, age, number of household members, household income, education level, occupation, and purpose of forest use. Third, unlike in previous studies, it was found that education level and household income are not necessarily significant factors in participation in forest preservation.

This paper examines the determinants of learning achievements in Cambodian primary schools. Both student factors and family factors are evaluated. The student factors consist of student age, enrollment age, frequency of homework completion, and number of questions to ask in class. The family factors include the father's educational background, domestic assets, and the student's commute time to school. The school factors are confirmed to influence the learning achievements, but the results are unclear as to what school factors have a concrete influence.

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We examine the international determinants of the formation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) according to the theory of hegemonic stability. The main conclusions are as follows. First, as the theory of hegemonic stability argues, the lack of a stable hegemon fosters the formation of PTAs. When hegemony is measured by trade share and investment share in the global economy, the erosion of hegemony fosters PTAs. Second, hegemony measured by GDP share has a positive effect on PTA formation; however, this measure is not consistent with the theory's prediction. Third, improvement in the level of democracy worldwide is unrelated to the formation of PTAs.

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The purpose of this paper is to consider a relationship between hegemonic reputation and a stability of hegemonic system by a finitely repeated game of asymmetric incomplete information.We show that even in an age of hegemonic decline, if the hegemon has a sufficiently strong reputation, a hegemonic system is stabilized by international regimes that are maintained by a hegemon's leadership and non-hegemons' cooperation. If the hegemonic reputation is not strong enough, however, the hegemonic system will be unstable.