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This paper investigates the effect of banks' lending capacity on firms' capital investment. To overcome the difficulties in identifying purely exogenous shocks to firms' bank financing, we utilize the natural experiment provided by the Great Hanshin-Awaji (Kobe) Earthquake in 1995. Using a unique firm-level dataset that allows us to identify firms and banks in the earthquake-affected area, together with information on bank-firm relationships, we find that the investment ratio of firms located outside of the earthquake-affected area but with their main banks inside the area was lower than that of firms that were both located and had their main banks outside of the area. This result implies that the weakened lending capacity of damaged banks exacerbated the borrowing constraints on the investment of their undamaged client firms. We also find that the negative impact is robust for two alternative measures of bank damage: that to the bank headquarters and that to the branch network. However, the impacts of the two are different in timing; while that of the former emerged immediately after the earthquake, the latter emerged with a one-year lag.

This paper investigates the effects of the ownership structure on the R&D intensity. Using the Japanese machine-manufacturing firm data from 1987 till 1998, we first found that the effects of R&D on stock market valuation and TFP growth were significantly positive in the latter half of the 1990s. Next, analyzing the determinants of the R&D intensity in 1998, we found that the shareholding ratios of large shareholders and the leverage ratios were positively correlated with R&D intensity, while the proportion of bank loans to total debt was negatively correlated with it. These results are consistent with the hypotheses that stress the disciplinary roles of large shareholders and debt. It is also consistent with a bank's holdup hypothesis. Finally, comparing the results of 1998 with those of 1989, we found that the positive roles of keiretsu affiliation and cross-shareholdings disappeared during the last decade.R&D, Corporate governance, Ownership structure, Japan,

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