Whereas protests have been discussed predominantly in terms of collective action issues, achieving coordination does not always guarantee success. Protest groups must also back their demands with sufficient threats. Some assert that threats are enhanced by the mobilization of more resources. Yet this conventional wisdom fails to explain why not all large-scale protests win government concessions or why some protest groups spend resources on their organizational infrastructure even though it will not inflict immediate damage on the government. Formalizing protest in a bargaining model, I show that investing in organizational infrastructure improves the impact of protest groups’ threats by lowering the probability that a counter-protest will offset the impact of the original protest.
Constitutional monarchies have proved to be resilient, and some have made substantive political interventions even though their positions are mostly hereditary, without granted constitutional channels to do so. This article examines how constitutional monarchs can influence political affairs and what impact royal intervention can have on politics. I argue that constitutional monarchs affect politics indirectly by influencing the preferences of the public who have de jure power to influence political leaders. The analyses herein show that constitutional monarchs do not indiscriminately intervene in politics, but their decisions to intervene reflect the public’s preferences. First, constitutional monarchs with little public approval become self-restraining and do not attempt to assert their political preferences. Second, they are more likely to intervene in politics when the public is less satisfied about the incumbent government. These findings are illustrated with historical narratives regarding the political involvement of King Bhumibol Adulyadej of Thailand in the 2000s.
My article (Inata, 2021) derives a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in a simple game to analyze power-sharing negotiation and commitment problems between an absolute monarch and the regime's elites. This equilibrium is, however, not unique, strictly speaking; while it is effectively unique in a behavioral sense because it generates the unique outcomes, it does not rule out all best-reply strategies. The article's conclusion about the role played by the public nevertheless remains intact. For interested readers, I will detail those equilibria in this correction.
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