The empirical basis for the child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS), a theoretical model that posits that sexually abused children frequently display secrecy, tentative disclosures, and retractions of abuse statements was reviewed. Two data sources were evaluated: retrospective studies of adults' reports of having been abused as children and concurrent or chart-review studies of children undergoing evaluation or treatment for sexual abuse. The evidence indicates that the majority of abused children do not reveal abuse during childhood. However, the evidence fails to support the notion that denials, tentative disclosures, and recantations characterize the disclosure patterns of children with validated histories of sexual abuse. These results are discussed in terms of their implications governing the admissibility of expert testimony on CSAAS. Although it is widely acknowledged that the sexual assault of children is a major societal concern, it is not known how many children are victims of sexual abuse in the United States (Ceci & Friedman, 2000). There are two major reasons for this lack of data. First, present estimates of the incidence of child sexual abuse (CSA) are primarily based on reports received and validated by child protection agencies. These figures, however, do not reflect the number of unreported cases or the number of cases reported to other types of agencies (e.g., sheriff's offices) and professionals (e.g., mental health diversion programs). Second, the accuracy of diagnosis of CSA is often difficult because definitive medical or physical evidence is lacking or inconclusive in the vast majority of cases (Bays & Chadwick, 1993; Berenson, Heger, & Andrews, 1991), and because there are no gold standard psychological symptoms specific to sexual abuse (Kendall-Tacket,

Methods used during forensic interviews with children are driven by beliefs about how children recall and report child sexual abuse (CSA) to others. Summit (1983) proposed a theory (Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome) contending that, due to the specific traumatic characteristics of CSA, children will often delay disclosing abuse or altogether fail to disclose during childhood, deny abuse when asked, and often recant abuse allegations. His theory has had a tremendous impact on the field of CSA forensic evaluations, despite its dearth of empirical support. In this paper, we review and critique the contemporary literature from two main sources: retrospective accounts from adults reporting CSA experiences and studies of children undergoing forensic evaluation for CSA. We conclude that data support the notion that children often delay abuse disclosure, but that among valid abuse cases undergoing forensic evaluation, denial and recantation are not common. Methodological issues and implications for forensic interviewers are discussed.

This study was designed to compare how 5-to 13-year-old children's leisure activity preferences differ with age and gender. Responses from 60 boys and 60 girls about their favorite toys, television shows, computer games, and outdoor activities were compared across leisure categories. The results showed that gender was a significant factor. Overall, boys spent more time in these leisure activities than girls did. They spent the most time engaged in sports, watching television, and playing computer games, whereas girls spent the most time watching television. Results from a gender index for all activities indicated that boys' leisure preferences became slightly more masculine with age. For girls, preferences for television shows became more feminine with age, but preferences for toys, computer games, and sports became less feminine. These self-chosen preferences may provide differential opportunities for the development of visual-spatial skills, achievement, initiative, self-regulation, and social skills.

Two paradigms were developed to examine autobiographical memory (ABM) and suggestibility in children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). Children with ASD (N = 30) and typically developing chronological age-matched children (N = 38) ranging in age from 5 to 10 years were administered an ABM questionnaire. Children were asked about details of current and past personally experienced events. Children also participated in a staged event, and later were provided with true and false reminders about that event. Later, children again were interviewed about the staged event. The results from both paradigms revealed that children with ASD showed poorer ABM compared to controls. Generally, their ABM was marked by errors of omission rather than by errors of commission, and memory was particularly poor for early-life events. In addition, they were as suggestible as the typically developing children. The results are discussed in terms of applied and theoretical implications.

Psychologists estimate the precision of their statistics both to conduct hypothesis tests and to construct confidence intervals. The methods traditionally used for this are available only for a small set of statistics (e.g., the mean and transformations of it) and often make unrealistic assumptions about the variables' distributions. These assumptions are often particularly unrealistic in data derived from clinical samples, or when looking at groups responding at the extreme end of clinical constructs. Bootstrap estimation is a computer intensive procedure that offers a flexible and automatic alternative. The computer takes thousands of bootstrap samples from the observed data and from these bootstrap samples estimates the precision of the statistic. High-speed personal computers make the bootstrap a viable and appealing technique throughout the sciences. This article offers a tutorial on the theory and practice of applying bootstrap estimation to data from clinical samples and measures relevant to experimental psychopathology.

When two people view the same event and later try to remember it together, what one person says affects what the other person reports. A model is presented which predicts that this memory conformity effect will be moderated, in different ways, by two components of social anxiety. People with higher fear of negative evaluation should be more influenced by their peers than others, but those with higher social anxiety related to avoiding social situations may be less influenced by their peers than others. Pairs of adolescent-aged participants took part in a face recognition study. For each trial one person responded and then the next person responded. The effect of what the first person said on the second person's response was measured; the size of the effect was moderated by the social anxiety measures as predicted by the model. This is the first study showing the relationship between social anxiety and memory suggestibility.

Whether and when children can apply their developing understanding of belief to persuasion was examined using interactive puppet tasks. Children selected 1 of 2 arguments to persuade a puppet to do something (e.g., pet a dog) after hearing the puppet's belief (e.g., "I think puppies bite"). Across 2 studies, 132 children (ages 3-7 years) engaged in these persuasion tasks and in false-belief reasoning tasks, presented in puppet and story formats. Belief-relevant argument selection increased with age, as did appropriate reasoning about false beliefs, and occurred more in puppet than story tasks. Results suggest that improvements in belief reasoning in early childhood may be reflected in social interactions such as persuasion.

Whether and when children use information about others' mental states to invent or select persuasive strategies were examined. In Study 1, preschoolers, 3rd-graders, and 6th-graders (ns = 11, 12, and 16, respectively; 17 girls) were told about story characters' persuading parents to buy pets or toys. Children were either given or not given information about story parents' beliefs and asked to invent or select appropriate arguments. Older children, but not preschoolers, used belief information to select arguments. Results were replicated in Study 2 (16 kindergartners, 16 3rd-graders; 19 girls). In Study 3, kindergartners and 1st-graders (N = 16; 6 girls) reasoned well on false-belief tasks but not on persuasion tasks, suggesting that failure to consider mental states in persuasion was not due to lack of a belief concept. Findings suggest that mental state understanding may continue to develop after the preschool years; methodological qualifications are also considered.