Corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure is becoming increasingly important for modern corporations. Focusing on voluntary CSR disclosure and drawing on upper echelons theory, we propose that voluntary CSR disclosure is the manifestation of managerial preferences (e.g., managers’ professional ethical values and standards). Specifically, we argue that top executives with an academic background tend to have higher professional and ethical standards than their non-academic counterparts. These standards lead them to act with self-restraint and to perceive CSR disclosure as an opportunity rather than a threat. Compared with non-academic executives, therefore, top executives with an academic background provide stakeholders with more CSR information. Based on a sample of publicly listed firms in China, we find a significant difference in voluntary CSR disclosure between firms led by academic executives and firms without academic top executives. This difference is smaller for firms that are state-owned, firms that are audited by large audit firms, and firms with greater analyst coverage. We contribute to the literature on CSR voluntary disclosure by providing an in-depth analysis of the effects of top management teams’ academic backgrounds.

This study examines the effect of managerial academic experience on firms' financial reporting quality. Using data from China, we find that firms with top managers possessing academic experience exhibit lower levels of both accrual and real earnings management, along with a lower probability of future restatements. This effect is more pronounced for firms with inefficient external monitoring, suggesting that the higher financial reporting quality is mainly explained by the managers' intrinsic motivation to report truthfully. The results hold when we use firm fixed-effect regressions, instrumental variable two-stage regressions, and a propensity score matching (PSM) approach to mitigate the omitted variable and endogeneity concerns. Our study suggests that academic experience can serve as a source of valuable expertise for corporate executives. K E Y W O R D Sacademic experience, earnings management, expertise, external monitoring, financial reporting quality, imprinting, intrinsic motivation, top management team

We analyze the consequences of a firm hiring a generalist CEO in terms of the audit fees paid by the firm. We find that audit fees of clients with generalist CEOs are higher than those of clients with specialist CEOs. This relation is robust to considering managerial ability, other CEO characteristics, various fixed effects, instrumental variables, and change analyses. We further show that fee differences are larger for firms with weaker monitoring and higher corporate litigation risks. Through path analysis, we find that both client business risk and misreporting risk contribute to the fee difference. Finally, we find that auditors are more likely to issue going-concern opinions to clients with generalist CEOs. Our study should be of interest to auditing standard setters who link management operating styles to audit risk. We shed light on how management operating styles associated with the CEOs' general or specialized skills affect audit pricing.

This study examines the effect of stock liquidity on corporate risk-taking behavior. We find that stock liquidity has a positive and significant effect on corporate risk-taking. We find consistent results when we use the split share structure reform (SSSR) in China as an exogenous shock to stock liquidity. We also investigate the channels through which stock liquidity affects risk-taking and find that increases in stock liquidity lower the cost of capital and increase the pay-for-performance sensitivity of managers. Finally, we conduct cross-sectional tests to rule out privatization as an alternative explanation for our results. Our study sheds light on the real effects of stock liquidity and contributes to the understanding of capital market development.

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