This paper studies channel consisting of a manufacturer and two retailers. As a basis for comparison, the first, multiagent Stackelberg model has been structured based on perfect rationality. Further, fairness preference theory will be embedded in marketing channel multiagent Stackelberg model, and the results show that if the retailers have a jealous fairness preference, the manufacturer will reduce the wholesale price, retailers will increase the effort level, product sales will be increased, and the total channel utility and manufacturers’ utility will be pareto improvement, but the pareto improvement of retailers’ utility is associated with the interval of jealousy fairness preference coefficient. If the retailers have a sympathetic fairness preference, the manufacturer increases wholesale price, retailers reduce the effort level, and the total channel utility, manufacturer’s utility, and retailers’ utility are less than that of the no fairness preference utility.
An existence result for the solution set of symmetric vector quasi-equilibrium problems that allows for discontinuities is obtained. Moreover, sufficient conditions for the generalized Levitin-Polyak well-posedness of symmetric vector quasi-equilibrium problems are established.
The infinity period dynamic control problem of distribution channel was studied with differential game approach. Four differential dynamic control models of coordinated channel game, uncoordinated static game, Stackelberg game with manufacture controlled, and Stackelberg game withnretailers controlled were constructed. Some results applied dynamic optimization theory made with Hamilton function. The conclusions are as follows. (1) Optimization brand investment controlled by manufacture has nothing to do with time. (2) Retail price was the most minimum when channel was integrated. (3) Manufacture’s profits of uncoordinated static game and Stackelberg game with manufacture controlled were more than Stackelberg game withnretailers controlled. (4) Retailer’s profits of Stackelberg game withnretailers controlled were less than Stackelberg game with manufacture controlled. (5) Channel’s total profits of Stackelberg game withnretailers controlled were the most minimum.
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