Common factors are ubiquitous. For example, there is a common factor, g, for intelligence. In vision, there is much weaker evidence for such common factors. For example, visual illusion magnitudes correlate only weakly with each other. Here, we investigated whether illusions are hyper-specific as in perceptual learning. First, we tested 19 variants of the Ebbinghaus illusion that differed in color, shape, or texture. Correlations between the illusion magnitudes of the different variants were mostly significant. Second, we reanalyzed a dataset from a previous experiment where 10 illusions were tested under four conditions of luminance and found significant correlations between the different luminance conditions of each illusion. However, there were only very weak correlations between the 10 different illusions. Third, five visual illusions were tested with four orientations. Again, there were significant correlations between the four orientations of each illusion, but not across different illusions. The weak inter-illusion correlations suggest that there is no unique common mechanism for the tested illusions. We suggest that most illusions make up their own factor.

Recent experimental studies show that emotions can have a significant effect on the way we think, decide, and solve problems. This paper presents a series of four experiments on how emotions affect logical reasoning. In two experiments different groups of participants first had to pass a manipulated intelligence test. Their emotional state was altered by giving them feedback, that they performed excellent, poor or on average. Then they completed a set of logical inference problems (with if p, then q statements) either in a Wason selection task paradigm or problems from the logical propositional calculus. Problem content also had either a positive, negative or neutral emotional value. Results showed a clear effect of emotions on reasoning performance. Participants in negative mood performed worse than participants in positive mood, but both groups were outperformed by the neutral mood reasoners. Problem content also had an effect on reasoning performance. In a second set of experiments, participants with exam or spider phobia solved logical problems with contents that were related to their anxiety disorder (spiders or exams). Spider phobic participants' performance was lowered by the spider-content, while exam anxious participants were not affected by the exam-related problem content. Overall, unlike some previous studies, no evidence was found that performance is improved when emotion and content are congruent. These results have consequences for cognitive reasoning research and also for cognitively oriented psychotherapy and the treatment of disorders like depression and anxiety.

Scientists have shown that many non‐human animals such as ants, dogs, or rats are very good at using smells to find their way through their environments. But are humans also capable of navigating through their environment based on olfactory cues? There is not much research on this topic, a gap that the present research seeks to bridge. We here provide one of the first empirical studies investigating the possibility of using olfactory cues as landmarks in human wayfinding. Forty subjects participated in a piloting study to determine the olfactory material for the main experiment. Then, 24 subjects completed a wayfinding experiment with 12 odors as orientation cues. Our results are astonishing: Participants were rather good at what we call “odor‐based wayfinding.” This indicates that the ability of humans to use olfactory cues for navigation is often underestimated. We discuss two different cognitive explanations and rule out the idea that our results are just an instance of sequential learning. Rather, we argue that humans can enrich their cognitive map of the environment with olfactory landmarks and may use them for wayfinding.

What characteristics constitute a “helpful” landmark for wayfinding and how are they represented in the human brain? Experiment 1 compared recognition and wayfinding performance for visual, verbal, and acoustic landmarks (animals) learned in our virtual environment SQUARELAND. Experiment 2 investigated landmark semantics, namely, famous versus unfamiliar buildings. The results showed that, first, the best recognition performance was observed for words (verbal condition) followed by sounds. Performance was worst for the pictorial landmark information. In the wayfinding phase, a similar level of performance was observed for all three modalities. Second, famous buildings were better recognized than unfamiliar ones, indicating a semantic influence. We conclude that nonvisual information may successfully constitute a landmark and discuss this within the context of current research on landmarks and human wayfinding.

Looking at the world with one eye, we do not notice a scotoma in the receptor-free area of the visual field where the optic nerve leaves the eye. Rather we perceive the brightness, color, and texture of the adjacent area as if they were actually there. The mechanisms underlying this kind of perceptual filling-in remain controversial. To better understand these processes, we determined the minimum region around the blind spot that needs to be stimulated for filling-in by carefully mapping the blind spot and presenting individually fitted stimulus frames of different width around it. Uniform filling-in was observed with frame widths as narrow as 0.05 degrees visual angle for color and 0.2 degrees for texture. Filling-in was incomplete, when the frame was no longer contiguous with the blind spot border due to an eye movement. These results are consistent with the idea that perceptual filling-in of the blind spot depends on local processes generated at the physiological edge of the cortical representation.