Analyses of genome-wide association study (GWAS) data have revealed that detectable genetic mosaicism involving large (>2 Mb) structural autosomal alterations occurs in a fraction of individuals. We present results for a set of 24,849 genotyped individuals (total GWAS set II [TGSII]) in whom 341 large autosomal abnormalities were observed in 168 (0.68%) individuals. Merging data from the new TGSII set with data from two prior reports (the Gene-Environment Association Studies and the total GWAS set I) generated a large dataset of 127,179 individuals; we then conducted a meta-analysis to investigate the patterns of detectable autosomal mosaicism (n = 1,315 events in 925 [0.73%] individuals). Restricting to events >2 Mb in size, we observed an increase in event frequency as event size decreased. The combined results underscore that the rate of detectable mosaicism increases with age (p value = 5.5 × 10(-31)) and is higher in men (p value = 0.002) but lower in participants of African ancestry (p value = 0.003). In a subset of 47 individuals from whom serial samples were collected up to 6 years apart, complex changes were noted over time and showed an overall increase in the proportion of mosaic cells as age increased. Our large combined sample allowed for a unique ability to characterize detectable genetic mosaicism involving large structural events and strengthens the emerging evidence of non-random erosion of the genome in the aging population.

Research Summary This article examines whether—in the absence of mandated disclosure requirements—shareholder activism can elicit greater disclosure of firms' exposure to climate change risks. We find that environmental shareholder activism increases the voluntary disclosure of climate change risks, especially if initiated by institutional investors, and even more so if initiated by long‐term institutional investors. We also find that companies that voluntarily disclose climate change risks following environmental shareholder activism achieve a higher valuation postdisclosure, suggesting that investors value transparency with respect to firms' exposure to climate change risks. Managerial Summary Climate change poses increasing risks to companies. Yet, despite the growing importance of climate change risks, little is known about companies' exposure to climate change risks, their disclosure of these risks, and what strategic actions they take to manage and mitigate these risks. In this study, we examine whether—in the absence of mandatory disclosure—shareholders can elicit greater corporate transparency with respect to climate change risks. We find that shareholder activism is effective, especially if initiated by long‐term institutional investors. We also find that the stock market reacts positively to companies' climate risk disclosure following environmental shareholder activism, suggesting that investors value transparency with respect to firms' exposure to climate change risks.

No abstract

In this article we examine the operating performance of stocks that switch from NASDAQ to the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) or the New Stock Exchange (NYSE) and from AMEX to the NYSE. Specifically, we investigate whether post-listing operating performance is consistent with the reported negative long-term drift of post-listing stock returns and whether there is evidence of self-selection of the listing time. We find evidence of negative post-listing changes in operating return on assets and sales, which, on a match-adjusted basis, are significant for the relatively small NASDAQ stocks switching to AMEX. We also find evidence that firms self-select the time of listing changes. 2003 The Southern Finance Association and the Southwestern Finance Association.

Common owners face an incredible investment challenge: managing systematic risk. Because common owners hold shares in multiple firms across an industry, an action (or inaction) by one firm that affects industry peers is felt more severely by common owners than by non-common owners. Research has largely focused on common owners’ role in orchestrating competitive dynamics among their portfolio firms, with almost no empirical investigation of how common owners manage systematic risk. Drawing on research showing that one firm’s corporate social responsibility (CSR) can produce positive spillovers for peer firms and that its irresponsibility can harm its peers, we argue that common owners increase firms’ CSR to produce spillovers that reduce systematic risk and multiply their investment returns. Consistent with our theory, we find that common ownership is positively associated with firm CSR. Unpacking that relationship, we find that increases in CSR are driven by common owners with long-term orientations and are concentrated in stakeholder sensitive industries, in which CSR spillovers are most economically impactful. We also find that common owners focus their efforts on financially material CSR over financially immaterial CSR. We use a natural experiment with a quasi-exogenous shock to rule out alternative explanations. Our study contributes to literatures on the antecedents of CSR and outcomes of common ownership, providing a new perspective on how common owners shape corporate strategic behavior.