The military historiography of early modern colonial America currently offers two contrary interpretations. One emphasises the exceptional nature of American warfare as a product of a process of military acculturation between the colonists and the native Americans; the other denies this acculturation in favour of the successful
The historiography of command of amphibious operations during the early modern era is typically addressed in one of two ways. One explanation discounts the treatment of command, suggesting that army—navy discord was inevitable and, in the absence of systemic amelioration of this friction, command as an operational variable always had a negative impact upon operational progress. The other approach more subtly reduces the emphasis placed upon the impact of command in joint operations and argues that its operational exercise through an executive council of war meant that it was largely a settled issue for contemporaries. By drawing upon the evidence of an amphibious campaign undertaken first in the Caribbean and then off the north-eastern American seaboard during the Nine Years War, 1688—97, this article rejuvenates another understanding of combined operational command, which harks back to the views of the principal eighteenth-century author on amphibious warfare, Thomas More Molyneaux. In this analysis, combined operational command is shown to be a negotiated operational construct between the service commanders and the government, as a result of which disagreements related to the command structure and the subsequent dilution of authority through an executive council of war significantly impacted upon operational success.
This articles assesses the strategic and operational purpose of England's combined army‐navy operations within the European theatre during the Nine Years’ War, 1688–97. Specifically, the historical consensus that these operations were simply a compromise product of the contemporary political discourse, and consistently suffered from poor preparation and implementation, is reassessed. In so doing, the article considers the combined service descents planned and executed against the northern French coastline between 1691 and 1694, including in particular the renowned operation at Brest in June 1694, and also those operations undertaken by Admiral Russell's Mediterranean fleet in 1695. Accordingly, the article argues that the strategic and operational dismissal of combined operations is based upon a misunderstanding of their contemporary purpose, and that these actions were in fact promoted by both the court and the ministry as strategic handmaidens to the wider continental and maritime strategies.
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