Changing collective behaviour and supporting non-pharmaceutical interventions is an important component in mitigating virus transmission during a pandemic. In a large international collaboration (Study 1, N = 49,968 across 67 countries), we investigated self-reported factors associated with public health behaviours (e.g., spatial distancing and stricter hygiene) and endorsed public policy interventions (e.g., closing bars and restaurants) during the early stage of the COVID-19 pandemic (April-May 2020). Respondents who reported identifying more strongly with their nation consistently reported greater engagement in public health behaviours and support for public health policies. Results were similar for representative and non-representative national samples. Study 2 (N = 42 countries) conceptually replicated the central finding using aggregate indices of national identity (obtained using the World Values Survey) and a measure of actual behaviour change during the pandemic (obtained from Google mobility reports). Higher levels of national identification prior to the pandemic predicted lower mobility during the early stage of the pandemic (r = −0.40). We discuss the potential implications of links between national identity, leadership, and public health for managing COVID-19 and future pandemics.

The idea of separating a person's consciousness and transferring it to another medium-'mind upload'-is being actively discussed in science, philosophy, and science fiction. Mind upload technologies are currently also being developed by private companies in Silicon Valley, and similar technological developments have received significant funding in the EU. Mind upload has important existential and ethical implications, yet little is known about how ordinary people actually feel about it. The current paper aims to provide a thorough moral psychological evaluation about various cognitive factors that explain people's feelings and reactions towards the use of mind upload technology. In four studies (including pilot) with a total of 952 participants, it was shown that biological and cultural cognitive factors help to determine how strongly people condemn mind upload. Both experimental manipulations in a laboratory and cross-sectional correlative online study designs were employed. The results showed that people who value purity norms and have higher sexual disgust sensitivity are more inclined to condemn mind upload. Furthermore, people who are anxious about death and condemn suicidal acts were more accepting of mind upload. Finally, higher science fiction literacy and/or hobbyism strongly predicted approval of mind upload. Several possible confounding factors were ruled out, including personality, values, individual tendencies towards rationality, and theory of mind capacities. Possible idiosyncrasies in the stimulus materials (whether consciousness is uploaded onto a computer, chimpanzee, artificial brain, or android; and whether the person's body physically dies during the process) were ruled out. The core findings inform ongoing philosophical discussions on how mind upload could (or should) be used in the future, and imply that mind upload is a much more salient topic for the general population than previously thought.

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Artificial intelligence and robotics are rapidly advancing. Humans are increasingly often affected by autonomous machines making choices with moral repercussions. At the same time, classical research in robotics shows that people are adverse to robots that appear eerily human—a phenomenon commonly referred to as the uncanny valley effect. Yet, little is known about how machines’ appearances influence how human evaluate their moral choices. Here we integrate the uncanny valley effect into moral psychology. In two experiments we test whether humans evaluate identical moral choices made by robots differently depending on the robots’ appearance. Participants evaluated either deontological (“rule based”) or utilitarian (“consequence based”) moral decisions made by different robots. The results provide first indication that people evaluate moral choices by robots that resemble humans as less moral compared to the same moral choices made by humans or non-human robots: a moral uncanny valley effect. We discuss the implications of our findings for moral psychology, social robotics and AI-safety policy.

In poker, detrimental decision-making as a result of losing control due to negative emotions is known as tilting. Previous evidence suggests that poker experience is related to better emotion regulation in dealing with poker losses, and possibly to reduced severity of tilting in the game. A correlational on-line study (N = 417) was conducted to operationalize the tilting phenomenon by defining certain experiential characteristics that conceivably protect players from tilting or predispose them to it. These characteristics, as well as a measurement of poker experience, were then used in predicting the severity of tilting. It was hypothesized that (1) players with more poker experience are more likely to perceive having tilted less severely, as a result of accumulating poker experience; (2) players with more poker experience have lower severity of tilting; (3) players with more poker experience report lower emotional sensitivity to losses; and (4) players with a higher emotional sensitivity to losses have higher severity of tilting. Hypotheses 1 and 4 were supported, hypothesis 3 was weakly supported, but contrary to hypothesis 2, poker experience was associated with higher tilting severity. It is argued that these results are sensible if experienced players are less likely to tilt in relative terms, per single hand, but more likely to tilt in the long run.