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This article examines the determinants of the entrepreneur's political participation by employing a unique matched firm‐institution data set from China. We find that the likelihood of an entrepreneur's participation can be explained by the underdevelopment of markets and market‐supporting institutions. According to our estimates, the probability of entering politics decreases by 8–20% from the mean when the institutional indices improve by one standard deviation. Our findings support the view that the institutional environment shapes the private entrepreneur's motivation to participate in politics; they also provide an example of how private entrepreneurs respond to state/market failure in developing and transition countries. (JEL G1, H00, O10, P2, P3)

he relationship between family size and outcomes for children has fascinated social scientists for decades, particularly since the emergence of the theory of the quantity-quality trade-off that was developed by Gary Becker and his associates (Becker 1960;Becker and Lewis 1973;Becker and Tomes 1976;Willis 1973).1 According to this model, an increasing marginal cost of quality (child outcome) with respect to quantity (number of children) leads to a trade-off between quantity and quality. Numerous empirical studies have attempted to test the quantity-quality trade-off and either confi rmed the prediction by observing a negative correlation between family size and child quality or found no such correlation (Anh et al. 1998;Blake 1981;Knodel, Havanon, and Sittitrai 1990;Knodel and Wongsith 1991;Sudha 1997).2 However, most studies simply treat family size as an exogenous variable and thus cannot establish causality. Both child quantity and child quality are endogenous variables because childbearing and child outcome are jointly chosen by parents (Browning 1992;Haveman and Wolfe 1995), which means that they are both affected by unobservable parental preferences and household characteristics.One important method for tackling endogeneity is to use the exogenous variations in family size that are caused by the natural occurrence of twins to isolate the causal effect of family size on child quality.3 Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980b), in a pioneering study

Since the introduction of the one-child policy in China in 1979, many more boys than girls have been born, foreshadowing a sizable bride shortage. What do young men unable to find wives do? This paper focuses on criminality, an asocial activity that has seen a marked rise since the mid-1990s. Exploiting province-year level variation, we find an elasticity of crime with respect to the sex ratio of 16- to 25-year-olds of 3.4, suggesting that male sex ratios can account for one-seventh of the rise in crime. We hypothesize that adverse marriage market conditions drive this association.