This critical interpretive research synthesis is on the topic of adaptation and skill. After an initial identification of 1995 abstracts we identified and collated a database of 140 publications that explicitly reference expertise and adaptation. We found that empirical data on adaptive skill are sparse and the literature base is largely conceptual. We differentiate the adaptive nature of expertise from routine or every day skill, and we redress the balance between what constitutes expertise and when expertise matters. We present an overview of current models of expertise including a project that we completed for the UK Ministry of Defence on the nature of adaptive skill. We discuss implications for future training by presenting empirically based training principles designed to develop adaptive skill. We assert that adaptive skill is the conditio sine qua non of expertise and conclude with suggestions for further research.
This paper describes new micro-foundations for theorizing about executive compensation, drawing on the behavioral economics literature and based on a more realistic set of behavioral assumptions than those which have typically been made by agency theorists. We call these micro-foundations "behavioral agency theory". In contrast to the standard agency framework, which focuses on monitoring costs and incentive alignment, behavioral agency theory places agent performance at the center of the agency model, arguing that the interests of shareholders and their agents are most likely to be aligned if executives are motivated to perform to the best of their abilities. We develop a line of argument first advanced by Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia (1998), and put the case for a more general reassessment of the behavioral assumptions underpinning agency theory. A model of economic man predicated on bounded rationality is proposed, adopting Wiseman and Gomez-Meija's assumptions about risk preferences, but incorporating new assumptions about time discounting, inequity aversion and the trade-off between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. We argue that behavioral agency theory provides a better framework for theorizing about executive compensation, an enhanced theory of agent behavior and an improved platform for making recommendations about the design of executive compensation plans.
In recent years, the topic of intuition has become an important focus of attention in psychology. It is often assumed to be a unitary construct; however, recent research suggests that intuition is multifaceted. This article disaggregates intuition by discriminating between domain-general mechanisms and domainspecific processes of intuiting and primary types of intuition and secondary types of intuition. The theoretical relationships between and within processes and types are examined and analyzed at behavioral and information processing levels, noting the importance in advances in social cognition research. As a result of this analysis, we provide a conceptual framework that connects intuitive processes and outcomes. The article concludes by outlining some of the implications of the framework and in particular highlights future methodological challenges faced by intuition researchers in laboratory and organizational field settings.
highlighting an area where these two pragmatic research paradigms overlap. Not only do researchers in these areas aim to improve our understanding of decision making, they provide practical and realistic alternatives to laboratory-based research on decision making. The article presents a number of propositions for future research on NDM and organizations.
Research on senior executive reward has typically explored the connection between pay, performance and the alignment of interests of executives and shareholders. This paper examines the relationship between reward and motivation, drawing on the psychological, behavioural economics and decision-making literatures. Based on two empirical studies of FTSE350 senior executives, the research examines whether long-term incentive plans are an effective and efficient way of motivating executives, taking into account risk, time discounting, uncertainty and fairness. It also addresses the shape of the senior executive payeffort curve. The paper concludes that the way executives frame choices, perceive value, assess probability, evaluate temporal effects and respond to uncertainty means that LTIPs are generally not efficient and are often not effective in meeting their objectives. It proposes that, in its current form, principal-agent theory does not provide a sound basis for modelling senior executive reward, and suggests five areas for development.
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