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Previous research has shown that the simultaneous execution of two actions (instead of only one) is not necessarily more difficult but can actually be easier (less error-prone), in particular when executing one action requires the simultaneous inhibition of another action. Corresponding inhibitory demands are particularly challenging when the to-be-inhibited action is highly prepotent (i.e., characterized by a strong urge to be executed). Here, we study a range of important potential sources of such prepotency. Building on a previously established paradigm to elicit dual-action benefits, participants responded to stimuli with single actions (either manual button press or saccade) or dual actions (button press and saccade). Crucially, we compared blocks in which these response demands were randomly intermixed (mixed blocks) with pure blocks involving only one type of response demand. The results highlight the impact of global (action-inherent) sources of action prepotency, as reflected in more pronounced inhibitory failures in saccade vs. manual control, but also more local (transient) sources of influence, as reflected in a greater probability of inhibition failures following trials that required the to-be-inhibited type of action. In addition, sequential analyses revealed that inhibitory control (including its failure) is exerted at the level of response modality representations, not at the level of fully specified response representations. In sum, the study highlights important preconditions and mechanisms underlying the observation of dual-action benefits.

Emojis are nowadays a common substitute for real facial expressions to integrate emotions in social interaction. In certain contexts, emojis possibly could also transport information beyond emotions, reflecting interindividual differences or social aspects. In this study, we investigated the influence of emojis as socioemotional feedback stimuli on behavior and neural responses in a social decision game. We modified the Ultimatum Game by including emotional feedback provided by the proposer as response to the decision of the participant as receiver. Therefore, we generated identities that differed in their feedback behavior to identify differences in the processing of emotional feedback in a positive (acceptance) versus negative (rejection) frame. Regarding offer sizes, we replicated the valence effect of feedback‐related negativity for small offer sizes evoking more negative brain potentials compared to larger ones. Further, we found an effect of affective emojis on distinct ERPs: A face‐detecting neural component (N170) was examined to be a part of the processing of emojis, which resulted in significantly more negative amplitudes in response to a sad‐looking emoji compared to smiling and neutral ones. Furthermore, P3 amplitudes indicate transmission effects from the feedback emoticons to the neural processing of different offer sizes. In contrast to previous findings, P3 responses of our subjects did not depend on the offer size, but rather by which kind of partner they were made. Since some evaluative processes did not reveal any effects, emojis seem to be less effective than real facial expressions, which convey more information that is socially meaningful.

Sense of agency (SoA) is the feeling of having control over one's actions and their outcomes. Previous research claimed that SoA is reflected in "intentional binding" effects, that is, the subjective compression of time between a voluntary action and an intended outcome. Conventional paradigms, however, typically lack an isolated manipulation of different degrees of agency (or intentionality), as the presence or absence of actions (along with subsequent perceptual changes) represents a potential confound variable. Using a newly developed paradigm, we were able to replicate typical "intentional binding" results in an initial experiment in which such a confound was deliberately included. We then eliminated this confound in a follow-up experiment by keeping the presence of actions and perceptual changes constant between conditions with and without agency while only manipulating subjective SoA. Here, explicit ratings showed that participants indeed felt responsible for effects in the Agency condition but not in the Baseline condition (demonstrating the successful manipulation of SoA), while we no longer found any differences in "intentional binding" effects between conditions. This indicates that previously reported relations between intentional binding and SoA could be merely based on procedural confounds. In particular, temporal compression effects usually interpreted in terms of "intentional binding" may rather result from more basic temporal grouping mechanisms for any (perceptual and/or motor) events that are perceived as meaningfully belonging together (e.g., as parts of a trial episode). Public Significance StatementNumerous previous studies showed a subjective compression of the temporal interval between a volitional action and an intentional effect, referred to as intentional binding. In this study, we show that these effects may be merely caused by procedural shortcomings and that intentional binding must therefore be viewed critically.