Unfortunately, as we all know, the philosophy of science is a very difficult subject of byzantine complexity and unplumbed depth. (Ziman, 1994, p. 27) !In a recent article in this journal, Brian Alters (1997) argued that, given the many ways in which the nature of science (NOS) is described and poor student responses to NOS instruments such as Nature of Scientific Knowledge Scale (NSKS), Nature of Science Scale (NOSS), Test on Understanding Science (TOUS), and others, it is time for science educators to reconsider the standard lists of tenets for the NOS. Alters suggested that philosophers of science are authorities on the NOS and that consequently, it would be wise to investigate their views of current NOS tenets. To that end, he conducted a survey of members of the Philosophy of Science Association, and, via various statistical techniques, made claims about the nature and extent of variation among philosophers of science regarding basic beliefs about the NOS. !As three philosophers of science, we laud Alters' attempt to understand philosophers of science' view on the NOS. We believe, however, that his techniques for investigating this question are inappropriate and that consequently, several of his conclusions are unwarranted. In this comment, we will substantiate these criticisms. In addition, we will address some of the important questions that motivate Alters' research and attempt to unravel the "byzantine complexity" of philosophical views about the NOS. We begin with our concerns regarding Alters' research. We then provide a taxonomy of philosophic issues; and finally, we suggest some roles for philosophy of science in science teaching and the education of science teachers.
Traditional epistemology has, in the main, presupposed that the primary task is to give a complete account of the concept knowledge and to state under what conditions it is possible to have it. In so doing, most accounts have been hierarchical, and all assume an idealized knower. The assumption of an idealized knower is essential for the traditional goal of generating an unassailable account of knowledge acquisition. Yet we, as individuals, fail to reach the ideal. Perhaps more important, we have epistemic goals not addressed in the traditional approach -among them, the ability to reach understanding in areas we deem important for our lives. Understanding is an epistemic concept. But how we obtain it has not traditionally been a focus. Developing an epistemic account that starts from a set of assumptions that differ from the traditional starting points will allow a different sort of epistemic theory, one on which generating understanding is a central goal and the idealized knower is replaced with an inquirer who is not merely fallible but working from a particular context with particular goals. Insight into how an epistemic account can include the particular concerns of an embedded inquirer can be found by examining the parallels between ethics and epistemology and, in particular, by examining the structure and starting points of virtue accounts. Here I develop several interrelated issues that contrast the goals and evaluative concepts that form the structure of both standard, traditional epistemological and ethical theories and virtue-centered theories. In the end, I sketch a virtue-centered epistemology that accords with who we are and how we gain understanding.
Through examples of embodied and learning-centered pedagogy, we discuss transformative learning of transgressive topics. We begin with a taxonomy of types of learning our students undergo as they resolve inconsistencies among their pre-existing beliefs and the material they confront in our course on feminist ethics and epistemology. We then discuss ways to help students maximize their learning while confronting internal inconsistencies. While we focus on feminist topics, our approach is broad enough to be relevant to anyone teaching a transgressive or controversial topic.
A ten chin^ actidty improves students' scientific reasaning by f w i n g attention on rhe causal, exphnamy m r e ofpsychological theories. The inmuctor's initial lecture emphacizes the argument fm callcd lnfmence to the Best Explanation (IBE). Srudents c m t r u r t IRE mpments by sorting a series of premisrc Imd concluions h i e d on currespondent inference tkmy (Jones E7 Dnuis. 1965). Discu~sion of argument strength follws, using t k concepn presented in t k lecture. Fifty-two introductory social psychology s t t u h a evaluated rhr nctivity faunrahly, and results of a nonequi~~alenr control poup experiment showed rhnt pamcipion imllroved their reasoning ahility. Sugestions for modifiing tk nctitmty for other psychology courses are prwided.Students' poor reasoning ability has been discussed at length in Teaching of Psychology (e.g., Gray, 1993; Rickahaugh, 1993), and many suggestions for refomling psychology classes rightly focus o n critical reawning as the needed remedy. The special issue on critical thinking (Halpern 61 Nummedal, 1995) has several common themes for improving the reasoning ability of psychology students: (a) use of cooperative learning; (b) explicit emphasis o n prohlemsolving pnlcedures; (c) effectiveness of verbalizing methods and strategies; and (d) importance of rnetacognition, which is the ability to c h m e appropriate cognit~ve strategies deliheratelv for a given problem or situation. Teaching critical reasoning is intended to move students from copying down and memorizing results to understanding the reasoning that leads to results. What becomes central is the reasoningprocesses that will remain valuable through theory change and in nondiscipline-specific setting. Angclo (1995) defined nitical reaming as "the intentional application of rational, higher order thinking skills, such a c analysis, synthesis, problem recognition and problem solving, inference :md evaluation" (p. 6). T h e activity we clescrihe is consistent with the goals of teaching critical reasoning; get it focuses more specifically on teaching scientific reasoning, addressing the narrower concern of finding causes. That is, students are invited to think ahout and discuss the nature of making causal inferences and to evaluate those inferences ha5ed o n stand:~rd-reasoning criteria.An understanding ofscientific reasoning can be increajed by embedding the teaching of scientific reasoning in the content of psychology courses (Nisbett, 1993). W e use a cooperative-learning activity t o illustrate how psychologiss use one particular form of scientific reasoning to make causal
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