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PRELIMINARY NOTES have the necessary qualifications. He does not have the devil in him, and without the devil a diplomat will go nowhere." 18 Nesselrode took his first post at Berlin soon after the acces sion of Alexander I. In the following fifty-five years his father's observation was borne out in a sense, because Nesselrode proved that he lacked something, perhaps a Faustian trait, which might have elevated him to true greatness. But he did build a career that was too striking to be written off to chance. He took an active part in nearly all of the major events of European diplo macy from the Treaty of Tilsit to the Crimean War; he held on to his position in the government against heavy opposition; he advanced steadily under two autocrats, Alexander and Nicholas I, whose temperaments were very different; and he influenced foreign policy at crucial moments. But in assessing his influence it must be realized that he worked quietly in the background, always subordinate both to Alexander, who was his own minister to a large extent, and to Nicholas, among the most absolute of nine teenth-century autocrats.19 Nesselrode was pragmatic. The qualities that held him in office for fifty years, when others such as Czartoryski and Capodistria passed from the scene too quickly to leave much more than regret for what might have been, were simply the attributes of a good administrator. They were undramaticthe same he brought to bear in his much-loved game of whista precise mind, a reliable memory, a ready wit, and a "gift of concentration" that enabled him to "handle large quantities of business."20 He struck Cobden as "like Metternich" more a master of "finesse and diplomacy, than as a man of genius."21 Real genius required en gagement, devotion to a cause in keeping with the spirit of the time, and while Nesselrode's ideals were noble and humanitarian, they were those of the ancien régime. If his "Germanism" in furiated Russians it was not because of any romantic affinity for

CHURCH HISTORY pains to respond. Only in the sense that this work moves chronologically, tells about events, is filled with proper nouns can we call it history. Beyond that, it is dogmatics, insensitive to the historian's charter: to understand and to share understanding.

The historian Presniakov has characterized the first quarter of the nineteenth century, the reign of Alexander I, as “Russia at the crossroads” (Rossiia na rasput'i). No longer content with slavish imitation of Western Europe, Russia now began to develop a culture which would be admired and emulated by the West. Once beyond the fringe of European diplomacy, the Empire now moved to the center of that arena. Shaped by her national traditions, but involved increasingly in continent-wide trends, the Russia of Alexander I was confronted by a varied and complex set of problems, both domestic and foreign, which demanded resolution. The destruction of the Napoleonic threat, the assimilation of subject nationalities, the establishment of efficient techniques and procedures of government, the articulation and implementation of national policies in education and in economic life were among the countless tasks which faced Alexander I and his advisors. Educated Russians of the day heatedly debated the most effective means of solving the myriad dilemmas.

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