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This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate.The Venezuelan Bolivar is pegged to the U.S. dollar and supported by foreign exchange restrictions. To assess the appropriateness of the peg during the current period of high oil export earnings and the likely consequences of a liberalization, this paper attempts to disentangle the effects of oil prices from other factors underlying the equilibrium real exchange rate, and examines the role of foreign exchange controls by extending the application of a vector error correction (VEC) model to parallel market exchange rates. Several findings are worth noting. First, oil prices have indeed played a significant role in determining a time-varying equilibrium real exchange rate path. Second, oil prices are not the only important determinant of the real effective exchange rate: declining productivity is also a key factor. Third, appreciation pressures are rising. Finally, the speed of convergence of a VEC model using parallel rather than official rates is higher, suggesting that the government has been able to maintain sharp deviations between the official and equilibrium rates because of Venezuela's oil dependency and the concentration of oil income in government hands.

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This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate. This paper examines the role of IMF-supported programs in crisis prevention; specifically, whether, conditional on an episode of intense market pressures, IMF financial support helps prevent a capital account crisis from developing and, if so, through what channels. In doing so, the paper distinguishes between the seal of approval inherent in IMF support and its financing, evaluates the interaction of IMF support with economic policies, and assesses whether IMF financing has a different impact on the likelihood of a crisis than other forms of liquidity. The main result is that IMF financing helps prevent crises through the liquidity provided (i.e., money matters). However, since the effect holds even after controlling for (gross) foreign exchange reserves, stronger policies and the seal of approval under an IMFsupported program must also play a role. Finally, the results suggest that IMF financing as a crisis prevention tool is most effective for an intermediate range of economic fundamentals. JEL Classification Numbers: F33, F34, N20, O19

This paper presents two approaches to modeling the use of IMF resources from the General Resources Account in order to gauge whether the recent decline in credit outstanding is a temporary or a permanent phenomenon. The two approaches-the time-series behavior of credit outstanding and a two-stage program selection and access model-yield the same conclusion: the use of IMF resources is likely to decline sharply. Specifically, credit outstanding is projected to decline from an average of SDR 50 billion over 2000À05 to an average of about SDR 8 billion over 2006À10. Stochastic simulations suggest that it is unlikely to be much higher. These results are based on the IMF's World Economic Outlook projections with a correction for historically observed overoptimistic biases. In addition, alternative scenarios assuming weaker economic performance or a less benign global economic environment do not materially alter these results. Ã At the time this paper was prepared, Atish Ghosh was division chief, and Juan Zalduendo a deputy division chief, of the Policy Review Division of the IMF's Policy Development and Review Department. Manuela Goretti and Bikas Joshi were economists, and Alun Thomas a senior economist, with the Policy Review Division. The authors would like to thank Mark Allen, Jorge Ma´rquez-Ruarte, Russell Kincaid, Jonathan Ostry, Gary Schinasi, Jim Boughton, Andy Berg, and other IMF colleagues for useful suggestions during the preparation of this paper, and Sibabrata Das for research assistance. Comments and suggestions from an anonymous referee are also deeply appreciated. The literature survey (Appendix II) is an abbreviated version of a survey prepared by