Abstract. In recent years several mathematics education researchers have attempted to analyse students' arguments using a restricted form of Toulmin's (1958) argumentation scheme. In this paper we report data from task-based interviews conducted with highly talented postgraduate mathematics students, and argue that a superior categorisation of genuine mathematical argumentation is provided by the use of Toulmin's full scheme. In particular, we suggest that modal qualifiers play an important and previously unrecognised role in mathematical argumentation, and that one of the goals of instruction should be to develop students' abilities to appropriately match up warrant-types with modal qualifiers.

Although proof comprehension is fundamental in advanced undergraduate mathematics courses, there has been limited research on what it means to understand a mathematical proof at this level and how such understanding can be assessed. In this paper, we address these issues by presenting a multidimensional model for assessing proof comprehension in undergraduate mathematics. Building on Yang and Lin's (Educational Studies in Mathematics 67:59-76, 2008) model of reading comprehension of proofs in high school geometry, we contend that in undergraduate mathematics a proof is not only understood in terms of the meaning, logical status, and logical chaining of its statements but also in terms of the proof's high-level ideas, its main components or modules, the methods it employs, and how it relates to specific examples. We illustrate how each of these types of understanding can be assessed in the context of a proof in number theory.

In this paper, we report a study in which nine research mathematicians were interviewed with regard to the goals guiding their reading of published proofs and the type of reasoning they use to reach these goals. Using the data from this study as well as data from a separate study (Weber, Journal for Research in Mathematics Education 39:431-459, 2008) and the philosophical literature on mathematical proof, we identify three general strategies that mathematicians employ when reading proofs: appealing to the authority of other mathematicians who read the proof, line-by-line reading, and modular reading. We argue that non-deductive reasoning plays an important role in each of these three strategies.

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We describe a case study in which we investigate the effectiveness of a lecture in advanced mathematics. We first videorecorded a lecture delivered by an experienced professor who had a reputation for being an outstanding instructor. Using video recall, we then interviewed the professor to determine the ideas that he intended to convey and how he tried to convey these ideas in this lecture. We also interviewed 6 students to see what they understood from this lecture. The students did not comprehend the ideas that the professor cited as central to his lecture. Based on our analyses, we propose 2 factors to account for why students did not understand these ideas.

In this article, we report a study in which 109 research-active mathematicians were asked to judge the validity of a purported proof in undergraduate calculus. Significant results from our study were as follows: (a) there was substantial disagreement among mathematicians regarding whether the argument was a valid proof, (b) applied mathematicians were more likely than pure mathematicians to judge the argument valid, (c) participants who judged the argument invalid were more confident in their judgments than those who judged it valid, and (d) participants who judged the argument valid usually did not change their judgment when presented with a reason raised by other mathematicians for why the proof should be judged invalid. These findings suggest that, contrary to some claims in the literature, there is not a single standard of validity among contemporary mathematicians.

Abstract. The received view of mathematical practice is that mathematicians gain certainty in mathematical assertions by deductive evidence rather than empirical or authoritarian evidence. This assumption has influenced mathematics instruction where students are expected to justify assertions with deductive arguments rather than by checking the assertion with specific examples or appealing to authorities. In this paper, we argue that the received view about mathematical practice is too simplistic; some mathematicians sometimes gain high levels of conviction with empirical or authoritarian evidence and sometimes do not gain full conviction from the proofs that they read. We discuss what implications this might have, both for for mathematics instruction and theories of epistemic cognition

The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-pro t purposes provided that:• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in DRO • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.Please consult the full DRO policy for further details. Abstract. Many mathematics education researchers have suggested that asking learners to generate examples of mathematical concepts is an effective way of learning about novel concepts. To date, however, this suggestion has limited empirical support. We asked undergraduate students to study a novel concept by either tackling example generation tasks, or reading worked solutions to these tasks. Contrary to suggestions in the literature, we found no advantage for the example generation group on subsequent proof production tasks. From a second study we found that undergraduate students overwhelmingly adopt a Trial and Error approach to example generation, and suggest that different example generation strategies may result in different learning gains. We conclude by arguing that the teaching strategy of example generation is not yet understood well enough to be a viable pedagogical recommendation.