No abstract

'Theory of Mind' refers to the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and other people (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). This study examined the extent to which 'Self' and 'Other' belief-attribution processes within the Theory of Mind (ToM) mechanism could be distinguished behaviourally, and whether these separable components differentially related to Executive Functioning (EF) abilities. A computerized false-belief task, utilizing a matched-design to allow direct comparison of self-oriented vs. other-oriented belief-attribution, was used to assess ToM, and a face-image Stroop task was employed to assess EF, within a population of typically-developed adults. Results revealed significantly longer reaction times when attributing beliefs to other people as opposed to recognizing and attributing beliefs to oneself. Intriguingly, results revealed that 'perspective-shift' requirements (i.e. changing from adoption of the 'self' perspective to the perspective of the 'other', or vice versa) across false-belief trials influenced reaction times. Reaction times were significantly longer when the perspective shift was from self-to-other than from other-to-self. It is suggested that the 'self' forms the stem of understanding the 'other', and is therefore processed regardless of ultimate task demands; in contrast, the 'other' perspective is only processed when explicitly required. We conclude that adopting another person's perspective, even when their belief state is matched to one's own, requires more cognitive effort than recalling and reflecting on self-oriented belief-states.

Olanzapine monotherapy appears to be efficacious in bipolar depression. Additional long-term studies are warranted to confirm these results. Safety findings were consistent with the known safety profile of olanzapine.

No abstract

This article presents a tentatively "balanced" view (i.e., midway between lean and rich interpretations) of pointing behavior in infants and apes, based upon the notion of intentional reading of behavior without simultaneous attribution of unobservable mental states. This can account for the complexity of infant pointing without attributing multilayered mindreading to infants. It can also account for ape pointing, which shares some of the complexities of infant pointing, but departs from it in other respects, notably in its range of motives and its focus upon the regulation of executive behavior. The article explores some explanations for these similarities and differences and calls for a new look at human infant communication unbiased by adult communication models.