The emergence of carriers that deliver items to geographically dispersed destinations quickly and at a reasonable cost, combined with the low cost of sharing information through networked databases, has opened up new opportunities to better manage inventory. We investigate these benefits in the context of a supply chain in which a manufacturer supplies expensive, low-demand items to vertically integrated or autonomous retailers via one central depot. The manufacturer's lead time is assumed to be due to the geographical distance from the market or a combination of low volumes, high variety, and inflexible production processes. We formulate and solve an appropriate mathematical model based on one-for-one inventory policies in which a replenishment order is placed as soon as the customer withdraws an item. We find that sharing and transshipment of items often, but not always, reduces the overall costs of holding, shipping, and waiting for inventory. Unexpectedly, these cost reductions are sometimes achieved through increasing overall inventory levels in the supply chain. Finally, while sharing of inventory typically benefits all the participants in decentralized supply chains, this is not necessarily the case---sharing can hurt the distributor or individual retailers, regardless of their relative power in the supply chain.Multi-Echelon Systems, Transshipment, Approximation in Inventory Models
We create an industrial organization type model to relate resources to the spread between product market demand and marginal cost. We define competitive advantage as the cross‐sectional differential in this spread, and performance as the longitudinal differential between what a firm appropriates in the product market and what it paid in the factor market. With factor markets imposing different costs on the innovator and potential imitator(s), competitive advantage, performance, and high resource value do not necessarily coincide. Also, the interaction between resource value and the cost of imitation is complex and affected by the number of firms in the industry. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
a b s t r a c tCreating competitive advantage based on operations capabilities is likely to require much analysis and communication within the operations function. At the same time, much communication and joint strategizing with the top and other functional executives is likely to be needed as well. Hence, given that operations executives have limited time and also have to perform many other routine tasks, they need to manage two tradeoffs. The first one is between the time spent on strategy making and the time spent on everything else. The other is within strategy making, between the time spent on "functional deliberation" within the operations function and "top-level communication" with other executives. Using a survey of 134 operations executives, we find that an increase in the time the operations executive spends on strategy making is positively associated with performance in complex and hostile environments and when the relative strength of the operations function within the firm is low. Within the operations executive's strategy making, an increased emphasis on top-level communication is positively associated with performance in environments that are complex, stable (less uncertain), or hostile.
T his study is motivated by examples of outsourcing that are not readily explained by widely established economic theories. We extend recent literature that develops the idea that outsourcing can help firms avoid overinvestment by specifying more precisely the conditions under which this thesis is likely to apply. Our extension is realized through a two-period game theoretic model in which the outsourcing and in-house investments are driven by (1) the cost required to develop a product or process module, (2) competitive relevance, defined as the module's share in the production cost or the module's importance to the customer, and (3) modularity, defined as the extent to which generic investments in the module can approach firm-specific investments in terms of the overall product/process performance. The analysis generates predictions about what types of insourcing, outsourcing, and non-sourcing behaviors are likely to emerge in different parts of the parameter space. Outsourcing to a more concentrated industry upstream emerges at equilibrium when modularity is high, relevance low to medium, and development cost high enough that none or only a subset of focal firms wants to invest. While firms are forced to insource and overinvest due to a prisoner's dilemma when the development cost is sufficiently high relative to the module's relevance, we do not find outsourcing equilibria that solve this problem in a two-period game with no commitment. This result implies that some form of tacit coordination in a multi-period game may be necessary. We conclude the study with a discussion of empirical implications.
We use computer simulation to study how different allocations of decision rights give rise to different organizational abilities to maintain and act upon accurate maps of a changing environment. We compare the performance of three archetypal organizational forms as we vary the dynamism and complexity of the environment and the rates at which individuals can observe the environment and imitate each other. We find that teams in which actions are based on plurality votes excel when the task is relatively easy—that is, the ability of individual members to observe the environment is high compared to the environment's dynamism and size. Markets in which all agents act independently perform well when the task is difficult and the agents can easily imitate each other. Hierarchies in which agents in the upper echelons impose actions on their subordinates outperform the other two forms when the agents' abilities to observe the environment are heterogeneous, the task is difficult, and imitation among the agents is moderate. The analysis has implications for the relationship between centralization and the notions of exploitation and exploration in March's influential work [March JG (1991) Exploration and exploitation in organizational learning. Organ. Sci. 2(1):71–87].
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