We evaluate the literature on the memorability of supernatural concepts (e.g., gods, ghosts, souls), itself part of a growing body of work in the emerging cognitive science of religion (Barrett, 2007). Specifically, we focus on Boyer’s (1994a, 2000, 2001) Minimally Counterintuitive (MCI) hypothesis according to which supernatural concepts tap a cognitively privileged memory-enhancing mechanism linked to violations of default intuitive inferences. Our assessment reveals that the literature on the MCI hypothesis is mired in empirical contradictions and methodological shortcomings which makes it difficult to assess the validity of competing theoretical models, including the MCI hypothesis itself. In light of this fractured picture, we make the case for an account of the MCI effect which dispenses with a memory mechanism specific to supernatural concepts. This account has several desirable properties. First, it preserves Boyer’s pioneering insights regarding the ontological status of supernatural concepts and the cognitive mechanisms that give rise to their cultural prevalence. Second, our account is based on independently-motivated mechanisms that are well-established in the literature. Third, this account offers a principled resolution of the tension in the extant literature between studies that do replicate the MCI effect and those that seemingly fail to do so. Finally, because the proposed mechanisms are not specific to supernatural concepts, the scope of the MCI effect may be extended to account for a broader range of highly transmissible concepts than those it was originally intended to explain. We conclude with a set of theoretical and methodological prescriptions designed to guide future research on the memorability of supernatural concepts.
Beliefs are, in many ways, central to psychology and, in turn, consistency is central to belief. Theories in philosophy and psychology assume that beliefs must be consistent with each other for people to be rational. That people fail to hold fully consistent beliefs has, therefore, been the subject of much theorizing, with numerous mechanisms proposed to explain how inconsistency is possible. Despite the widespread assumption of consistency as a default, achieving a consistent set of beliefs is computationally intractable. We review research on consistency in philosophy and psychology and argue that it is consistency, not inconsistency, that requires explanation. We discuss evidence from the attitude, belief, and persuasion literatures, which suggests that accessibility of beliefs in memory is one possible mechanism for achieving a limited, but psychologically plausible, form of consistency. Finally, we conclude by suggesting future directions for research beginning from the assumption of inconsistency as the default. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Reasoning and Decision Making Psychology > Theory and Methods Philosophy > Knowledge and Belief
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The minimally counterintuitive (MCI) thesis in the cognitive science of religion proposes that supernatural concepts are prevalent across cultures because they possess a common structure—namely, violations of intuitive ontological assumptions that facilitate concept representation. These violations are hypothesized to give supernatural concepts a memorability advantage over both intuitive concepts and “maximally counterintuitive” (MXCI) concepts, which contain numerous ontological violations. However, the connection between MCI concepts and bizarre (BIZ) but not supernatural concepts, for which memorability advantages are predicted by the von Restorff (VR) effect, has been insufficiently clarified by earlier research. Additionally, the role of inferential potential (IP) in determining MCI concepts’ memorability has remained vague and only rarely controlled for. In a pre‐registered experiment, we directly compare memorability for MCI and MXCI concepts, compared to BIZ concepts, while controlling for IP as well as degree of bizarreness. Results indicate that when IP and bizarreness are controlled for, memorability of counterintuitive and BIZ concepts—relative to intuitive control concepts—is similar across concepts with one, two, and three characteristics. Findings suggest that the MCI and VR effects may be manifestations of the same underlying mechanisms.
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