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Retroactive inhibition was produced under free recall conditions in an experiment in which ^s learned and subsequently recalled from one to six categorically structured lists. The observed retroactive inhibition was attributable mainly to the lowered probability of recall of word categories as higher order memory units. Recall of words within recalled categories was not greatly affected. Presentation of category names as retrieval cues largely removed retroactive effects and restored word recall to nearly its original level. It was concluded that retroactive inhibition in free recall of organized lists (a) represents a state of memory in which higher order units of information are available but not accessible in the memory store, (b) reflects altered stimulating conditions brought about by interpolated learning, and (c) can thus be described as an instance of cue-dependent forgetting.Successful retrieval of mnemonic informa-hibition : loss of retrievability of information tion about an encoded event requires both stored earlier as a consequence of subsequent availability of appropriate event information storage of some other information. An exin the store and access to that information at periment is described in which 5"s studied the desired time (Tulving & Pearlstone, and recalled several lists of familiar words 1966). Failure of retrieval, in this view, as the events to be remembered and then comes about either as a consequence of attempted to recall all previously seen words deterioration of stored event information or in a "total" free recall test. It is known that because of the failure of the access mechan-under these conditions, retroactive inhibition ism. To the extent that retrieval failure can effects can be readily demonstrated (e.g., be identified with "forgetting," there are Postman & Keppel, 1967 ; Tulving & Thornthus two sources, and two kinds, of for-ton, 1959), although the processes undergetting : "trace-dependent" and "cue-depen-lying these effects are only dimly understood dent" forgetting (Tulving & Madigan, at the present time. 1970).The experiment was planned to provide This paper illustrates the application of evidence on two specific issues. First, how such a view of recall and forgetting to the is retroactive inhibition reflected in recall and well-known phenomenon of retroactive in-forgetting of elementary and higher order units of material ? One theory of free recall holds that nominal elementary units of the . the National Science Foundation, Grant GB 3710, list, such as individual words, are organized Grant 24171X.by S into higher order units when the mate-Requests for reprints should be sent to E. r j a i j s studied, and that recall of at least Tul y ing -°eP a , rtme " t °f P'y^osy-Yale Urn-SQme f th nominal units }s me diated versity, 333 Cedar Street, New Haven, Connecticut . . . ... 06510 through recall of their respective higher

A series of experiments looked at the pattern of dot placements created when people individually placed a single dot inside empty outline figures. The superimposed results were found to compare better with the predictions of Blum's grassfire model than with a size-constancy process. The pattern of superimposed dots conformed to the stick figure of the outlined contours. A perceptual model based on spatial harmonic analysis of complex visual scenes is offered as an explanation for the pattern of results.

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This paper evaluates 2 adjustments to common scoring approaches for situational judgment tests (SJTs). These adjustments can result in substantial improvements to item validity, reductions in mean racial differences, and resistance to coaching designed to improve scores. The first adjustment, applicable to SJTs that use Likert scales, controls for elevation and scatter (Cronbach & Gleser, 1953). This adjustment improves item validity. Also, because there is a White-Black mean difference in the preference for extreme responses on Likert scales (Bachman & O'Malley, 1984), these adjustments substantially reduce White-Black mean score differences. Furthermore, this adjustment often eliminates the score elevation associated with the coaching strategy of avoiding extreme responses (Cullen, Sackett, & Lievens, 2006). Item validity is shown to have a U-shaped relationship with item means. This holds both for SJTs with Likert score response formats and for SJTs where respondents identify the best and worst response option. Given the U-shaped relationship, the second adjustment is to drop items with midrange item means. This permits the SJT to be shortened, sometimes dramatically, without necessarily harming validity.

Researchers have rarely examined stressful environments and psychological characteristics as predictors of driving behavior in the same study. The authors hypothesized that (a) safer drivers more accurately assess physical and emotional traffic hazards and (b) stress and emotional states elevate crash risk. The hypotheses were evaluated with procedural and declarative tacit driving knowledge tests requiring assessment of emotional and contextual hazards and with accident reports describing crash antecedents, including stressful events and environmental conditions. Analyses identified separate driving knowledge factors corresponding to emotional and contextual hazards that were significantly related to the crash criteria. Accident report analyses show that stress significantly elevates at-fault crash risk. The results demonstrate the importance of experiential knowledge acquired without instruction (procedural or tacit knowledge) and provide safety recommendations.

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