Seven experiments were conducted to examine the role of attention in automatization. Ss searched 2-word displays for members of a target category in divided-attention, focused-attention, and dual-task conditions. The main issue was whether attention conditions would affect what Ss learned about co-occurrences of the words in the displays. The attention hypothesis, derived from the instance theory of automaticity, predicts learning of co-occurrences in divided-attention and dual-task conditions in which Ss attend to both words but not in focused-attention conditions in which Ss only attend to 1 word. The data supported the attention hypothesis and therefore the instance theory. This article concerns what is learned during automatization. This is an important question in the automaticity literature, especially from the perspective of memory-based theories, such as the instance theory of automaticity (Logan, 1988,1990, 1992). Memory-based theories assume that automatic performance is based on retrieval of representations of past solutions from memory. What "gets into" those representations during learning and what is "taken out" of them during automatic performance are central questions in memory-based theories. The purpose of this article is to evaluate the answers offered by the instance theory of automaticity. The answers are important because they are derived from two of the three main assumptions of the theory: obligatory encoding and instance representation. The obligatory encoding assumption says that attention determines what gets into the representation. The instance representation assumption says that the representations in memory are instances-separate representations of cooccurrences. Attention determines what is in an instance; attention determines which co-occurrences are remembered. The experiments tested this hypothesis. What Is an Instance? The instance representation assumption consists of two related assumptions. The first is that each event is represented

The instance theory of automaticity claims that people learn what they attend to and express what they learned in transfer if they attend to the same things in the same way. These hypotheses were tested in 8 category search experiments in which target position was cued by color (red or green). The main question was whether target color would be encoded in training and retrieved in transfer. After training, recognition memory for target color was above chance, which suggests that color was encoded. However, category search performance was not affected by changing target color unless color was reported explicitly during training and transfer, which suggests that color was not always retrieved. The results are consistent with the instance theory. The distinction between encoding and retrieval is important in understanding the acquisition and expression of automaticity. Automatic performance emphasizes speed and so may not be sensitive to things that are retrieved slowly.

According to fear-avoidance models of pain perception, heightened fear of pain may increase disruptive effects of pain; however, the extent to which this affects self-reported pain severity versus physiological indices of pain is not well delineated. The current study examined self-report measures and physiological indices of pain during a cold pressor (CP) task. Individual differences in fear of pain and pain catastrophizing were also assessed via questionnaire. The primary aim of the current study was to examine the extent to which individual differences associated with fear and catastrophizing in response to pain influences subjective and physiological measures of pain. A secondary aim was to examine gender differences associated with response to pain. Average subjective pain ratings were higher for females than males. In contrast, males exhibited higher systolic and diastolic reactivity in response to the CP task relative to females, as well as failure to fully recover to baseline levels. Follow-up correlational analyses revealed that subjective pain ratings were positively associated with fear of pain in both sexes, but were not associated with cardiovascular indices. These results suggest that fear of pain and pain catastrophizing do not influence cardiovascular responses to induced pain. Further research is necessary in order to determine whether these gender differences in blood pressure and heart rate response profiles are due to biological or psychosocial influences. Results support the notion that fear of pain increases subjective pain ratings, but does not influence cardiovascular responses during CP pain-induction.

The purpose of this study was to determine the accuracy of Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory 2nd edition (MMPI-2; Butcher, Dahlstrom, Graham, Tellegen, & Kaemmer, 1989) validity indicators in the detection of malingering in clinical patients with chronic pain using a hybrid clinical-known groups/simulator design. The sample consisted of patients without financial incentive (n = 23), nonmalingering patients with financial incentive (n = 34), patients definitively determined to be malingering based on published criteria ( n = 32), and college students asked to simulate pain-related disability (n = 26). The MMPI-2 validity scales differentiated malingerers from nonmalingerers with a high degree of accuracy. Hypochondriasis and Hysteria were also effective. For all variables except Scale L, more extreme scores were associated with higher specificity. This study demonstrates that the MMPI-2 is capable of differentiating intentional exaggeration from the effects on symptom report of chronic pain, genuine psychological disturbance, and concurrent stress associated with pursuing a claim in a medico-legal context.

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BackgroundRecent studies suggest that yoga practice may improve cognitive functioning. Although preliminary data indicate that yoga improves working memory (WM), high-resolution information about the type of WM subconstructs, namely maintenance and manipulation, is not available. Furthermore, the association between cognitive enhancement and improved mindfulness as a result of yoga practice requires empirical examination. The aim of the present study is to assess the impact of a brief yoga program on WM maintenance, WM manipulation and attentive mindfulness.MethodsMeasures of WM (Digit Span Forward, Backward, and Sequencing, and Letter-Number Sequencing) were administered prior to and following 6 sessions of yoga (N = 43). Additionally, the Mindfulness Attention Awareness Scale was administered to examine the potential impact of yoga practice on mindfulness, as well as the relationships among changes in WM and mindfulness.ResultsAnalyses revealed significant improvement from pre- to post- training assessment on both maintenance WM (Digit Span Forward) and manipulation WM (Digit Span Backward and Letter-Number Sequencing). No change was found on Digit Span Sequencing. Improvement was also found on mindfulness scores. However, no correlation was observed between mindfulness and WM measures.ConclusionsA 6-session yoga program was associated with improvement on manipulation and maintenance WM measures as well as enhanced mindfulness scores. Additional research is needed to understand the extent of yoga-related cognitive enhancement and mechanisms by which yoga may enhance cognition, ideally by utilizing randomized controlled trials and more comprehensive neuropsychological batteries.

Ego-depletion refers to the purported decrease in performance on a task requiring self-control after engaging in a previous task involving self-control, with self-control proposed to be a limited resource. Despite many published studies consistent with this hypothesis, recurrent null findings within our laboratory and indications of publication bias have called into question the validity of the depletion effect. This project used three depletion protocols involved three different depleting initial tasks followed by three different self-control tasks as dependent measures (total n = 840). For each method, effect sizes were not significantly different from zero When data were aggregated across the three different methods and examined meta-analytically, the pooled effect size was not significantly different from zero (for all priors evaluated, Hedges' g = 0.10 with 95% credibility interval of [-0.05, 0.24]) and Bayes factors reflected strong support for the null hypothesis (Bayes factor > 25 for all priors evaluated).

We sketch an initial version of a theory intended to account for the role of attention in the acquisition and expression of automaticity, and we test some initial predictions. The theory combines Logan's instance theory of automaticity and Bundesen's theory of visual attention, with Bundesen's theory determining what Logan's theory learns. We report four experiments that test the assumption that subjects learn what they report explicitly do not learn what they do not report explicitly. The experiments provide partial support for the predictions and encourage further development of the combined theory.