We propose a protocol for anonymous distribution of quantum information that can be used to implement either channel with anonymous sender or channel with anonymous receiver. Our protocol achieves anonymity and message secrecy with unconditional security. It uses classical anonymous transfer. It tolerates disruption of the protocol, but the number of disrupters must be limited by the quantum Gilbert-Varshamov bound. This bound can be exceeded provided a specific entanglement distillation procedure will be used. A different version of the protocol tolerates any number of disrupters, but is secure only when receiver does not actively cooperate with other corrupted participants.
While many scenarios of anonymous communication can be solved by various famous classical techniques including mix nets or dining cryptographers (DC), an abundant amount of anonymous tasks remains open. In this paper, we present a solution to one such task. Our protocol serves as a private communication channel for quantum messages while ensuring that both the sender and the receiver stay anonymous in a set of all parties. Our protocol is a continuation of our previous work on anonymous transmission of quantum information. The protocol does not require trusted parties, and is secure against an active adversary. It can also withstand denial of service attacks. The protocol exhibits an advantage of quantum resources over classical because no classical solution is known (in the same security settings). Entanglement swapping technique is used to create "symmetry" in the protocol, which makes it very transparent and easier to analyze. The security analysis we present is heavily based on our previous work on quantum anonymous communication. The task we implement is also a nice illustration of a cryptographic task where two parties in a multi-party protocol can be dishonest at the same time, but are not cooperating.
We present a semiformal model of anonymous communication with several participants performing several anonymous actions on several messages, e.g. in digital pseudosignatures. The goal is to design a model having enough expressive power to model simple as well as very complex anonymous communication patterns.Our model concentrates on anonymity of a sender, a receiver, and on the relationship anonymity. However, the model is easy to adopt to other types of anonymity. A special anonymous channel formalism is introduced and extensively explored in this paper. The formalism builds on the top of so-called estimation procedure which takes knowledge of the adversary and processes it to find anonymous participants. Some other, already published, models of anonymity, e.g. the model of Hughes and Shmatikov or of Halpern and O'Neill, are compatible with our model – they could be used as building blocks together with (or instead of) our estimation procedure. Therefore, the tools developed for those models can be easily adapted to be used with our model.We use protocol runs and an observational equivalence on the runs which is induced by adversary's knowledge. This is a well developed area of the theoretical computer science and many tools developed therein can be adapted to work with our model. Our model is also open to many additional features, e.g. the possibility to include probability distributions on anonymity sets.
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