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Job security provisions are commonly invoked to explain the high and persistent European unemployment rates. This belief has led several countries to reform their labor markets and liberalize the use of fixed-term contracts. Despite how common such contracts have become after deregulation, there is a lack of quantitative analysis of their impact on the economy. To fill this gap, we build a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents and firing costs in the tradition of Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993). We calibrate our model to Spanish data, choosing in part parameters estimated with firm-level longitudinal data. Spain is particularly interesting, since its labor regulations are among the most protective in the OECD, and both its unemployment and its share of fixed-term employment are the highest. We find that fixed-term contracts increase unemployment, reduce output, and raise productivity. The welfare effects are ambiguous.

In this paper we summarize the results of a broad exploratory empirical analysis where we relate the level of financial development with the effectiveness of monetary policy. The analysis is based on a panel of countries for whom we calculate measures both of financial development and of monetary policy effectiveness. We look for statistically significant relationships between the indicators of financial development, the effectiveness coefficients and other macroeconomic characteristics by estimating dynamic panels and performing a cluster analysis. We present our results in the form of a list of stylized facts that we consider deserve further attention. Abstract In this paper we summarize the results of a broad exploratory empirical analysis where we relate the level of …nancial development with the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy. The analysis is based on a panel of countries for whom we calculate measures both of …nancial development and of monetary policy e¤ectiveness. We look for statistically signi…cant relationships between the indicators of …nancial development, the e¤ectiveness coe¢ cients and other macroeconomic characteristics by estimating dynamic panels and performing a cluster analysis. We present our results in the form of a list of stylized facts that we consider deserve further attention. Luis CarranzaJEL: G15, E44, E52

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. www.econstor.eu The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. Terms of use: Documents in D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E SIZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author. In this paper the differences in the incidence of pay for performance plans between occupations in a sample of Spanish manufacturing establishments are analyzed. Our results show that there are significant differences between occupations in the incidence of individual, group and firm or plant pay for performance plans. The roles of establishment size, multinational ownership and the human resources management department in the incidence of pay for performance plans and their variability of use across occupations within the same firm are also studied. These factors are found to correlate to a greater use of pay for performance and, in most cases, this effect is homogenous across occupations.JEL Classification: M52

This paper analyzes the impact of the exchange rate volatility on the performance of the Peruvian economy using financial information from 163 non-financial listed firms. We find evidence that, for firms holding dollar-denominated debt, investment decisions are negatively affected by real exchange rate depreciation. The reasons behind this result are: (i) the high degree of liability dollarization and currency mismatch that create the conditions for a balance sheet effect and a financial stress in the aftermath of a currency depreciation, (ii) the strong bank-lending channel that follows and reinforces the balance sheet effect, (iii) the domestic demand shrinkage that affects severely the firms sales, and (iv) the relatively small and poorly diversified export sector.